C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

72from the fact that the Direction de Renseignement Militaire (DRM) under General Heinrich, in terms of thegathering of intelligence about Bosnia, was generally judged positively in Paris too. 331The problem, however, was that the DRM absolutely refused to share its intelligence withNATO allies. The service was able to locate the positions of ABiH and VRS snipers and evenemployed Black Teams to take out snipers at night. The uncooperative attitude of the French causedgreat problems when a combined Danish-Swedish unit took over a part of the sector in Sarajevo thatuntil then had been under French units. The DRM refused to disclose the positions of the ABiHsnipers to this new unit, insofar as they were aware of these, which resulted in dead and wounded onthe Scandinavian side. According to staff of the Canadian intelligence community, however, the DRMcooperated on special operations with the German BND. 332The need for intelligence steadily increased during the conflict. Therefore, in addition to theUnited Kingdom, other NATO member states also established their own national intelligence cells inorder to safely provide the ‘national’ commanders within UNPROFOR with timely and accurateintelligence. The French intelligence services had their own intelligence cell, and turned out to be ableto build up an excellent intelligence network in Sarajevo in a relatively short time.The Canadians also had their own cell and a special unit in Pleso, near Zagreb, which wasresponsible for processing the daily flow of Comint from Ottawa. This was the Canadian ForcesInformation Operations Group (CFIOG), which was stationed in Pleso during the war in Bosnia.There was also a special Sigint unit there, which reported directly to the Deputy Force Commander(DFC), the Canadian General Ray Crabbe and later General Ashton. This unit arrived in Pleso inMarch 1995, where it worked with all source intelligence. The DFC therefore had an analysis unit withall capabilities and resources at his disposal. There was a direct line with the Department of Defence inOttawa. Sometimes the American services would pass on intelligence to General Ashton, to which heremarked that he had already received it from ‘his boys’ in Pleso. 333Only some considerable time after the fall of Srebrenica, in January 1996, did a NetherlandsNational Intelligence Cell (abbreviated to NETHNIC) become attached to NATO headquarters inZagreb. This was in principle a ‘one-way gateway’, intended to pass on Dutch intelligence to theintelligence officer in Zagreb. 334 Other countries also had a national intelligence cell. For instance, theSwedish Vice-Admiral Magnus Haglund was head of the Swedish National Intelligence Cell (SWENIC)in Zagreb. Haglund collaborated closely with the German, British and Danish cells (GEMNIC,UKNIC and DANNIC) in particular to procure intelligence; he had fewer dealings with the Dutch cell.He did point out that the Dutch cell was usually avoided, because it was often affected by viruses in thecomputer systems. 335Besides technical resources, such as Imint and Sigint that were deployed for national intelligencegathering, various intelligence services often made use of Humint sources and the secondment ofintelligence officers to a suitable location. The favourite secondment locations were in the various staffsand in Akashi’s supporting unit in Zagreb. For instance, Akashi had a French advisor who worked forthe French foreign intelligence service. The problem for this advisor, as he told another of Akashi’sadvisors, was that most other staff members knew what was going on, and at some meetings thisFrenchman was consequently no longer welcome. This official’s crowning glory was on his departure inAugust 1995, when he spent an entire afternoon loading a truck with boxes of documents. He laterwent to work for the European Commission Monitoring Mission (ECMM). According to this advisorto Akashi, this was also a favourite ‘hangout’ for intelligence personnel. 336 Indeed, it will become clear331 ‘Changes at the Top in French Intelligence’, Intelligence Newsletter, no. 266, 15/06/95.332 Confidential interview (9). See also Chapter 4 of this study.333 Confidential interview (54).334 MoD, MIS/Army, No. 2636, DOKL/IV, Kol. J. Mulder to Head AI MIS, Col. B. Werger, 23/02/96.335 Interview with Magnus Haglund, 04/11/99.336 Interview with Tone Bringa, 13/07/99.