C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

326action on the enclave. 1809 At the time there were varying accounts of the numbers of Serb dead resultingfrom ABiH attacks.Another significant reason for the VRS general staff to start the operation was to release troopswho were badly needed elsewhere. The troops were required around Sarajevo and elsewhere on thefront line held by the Drina Corps.1810 The NATO bombardment on Pale on 25 and 26 May alsoinfluenced the decision to attack the enclaves, according to the ABiH. The bombardments led to afurther degradation of the military infrastructure and strengthened the support for a military solution tothe crisis. 1811 Moreover, the morale of part of the VRS was low and a victory at Srebrenica could help torestore this. 1812 Possibly the strategy pursued by the Croats also influenced the decision to initiate theattack on Srebrenica. Releasing troops to resist the Croatian operations in the Krajina (which hadstarted on 4 June 1995) could, according to ABiH Corps Commander Sead Delic, also have played arole. 1813 On the Bosnian side there were no further insights into the motivation for the VRS attack.As regards the progress of the attack: it suffices to say here that the operational plan for Krivaja‘95 was developed in a very short period and that there was also little time for the preparations.Moreover, the aim of the operation was not the conquest of Srebrenica but to reduce the size of theenclave in order to cut the links with Zepa. It appears that UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Muslims hadno knowledge of the VRS plans for this operation. Although Mladic once again pointed out to Janvieron 29 June that there were a large number of armed men in the enclaves who formed a threat to theVRS,1814 there was little that pointed to preparations for an attack. At the start of July it was still fairlyquiet in the enclave, despite an increase in battle incidents, which was however limited. The lastsituation report issued by Dutchbat on 5 July, hours before the start of the attack, reported that thegeneral situation was assessed as calm and stable. No major changes were expected in the coming 24hours. 1815 On 5 July the 28th Division of the ABiH in Srebrenica reported to 2nd Corps in Tuzla thatthere were indications of a possible major offensive. The population had been observing troopmovements for some time and reconnaissance had revealed that VRS units had arrived in the areaaround Zeleni Jadar in the afternoon of 5 July. 1816 It is striking that it was not until the morning of 6July that the 28th Division reported that a large column of armoured and mechanized units was movingfrom the area around Zvornik towards Bratunac. 1817 The relocation of the VRS’s heavy equipment,chiefly moved in from Zvornik, had not been noted by the ABiH and had also not been revealed byintercepts of radio traffic. This would have been the chief indication of an attack. It was purecoincidence that a passing convoy of the UN’s refugee organization, UNHCR, noticed these convoys.Starting from the positions that had been taken up around the enclave on 5 July, the Bosnian Serbswere to conduct the final act in what was to become the drama of Srebrenica.On 6 July the VRS started its attack on positions of Dutchbat and the ABiH at the southernedge of the enclave. Almost all efforts were aimed at this sector, which was in line with the primary goalto separate Srebrenica and Zepa. The VRS advance went so well that the evening of 9 July saw animportant ‘turning point’ of which Dutchbat, UNPROFOR and the ABiH were not aware. The1809 Interview with Zoran Jovanovic, 13/09/99.1810 ICTY (IT-98-33) D 160/a, Radinovic Report, section 3.3.1811 Interview with Semsudin Murinovic, 17/05/99.1812 Interview with Sefko Tihic, 08/03/99.1813 Interview with S. Delic, 10/03/99.1814 UNNY, DPKO coded cables. Code Cable Janvier to Annan New York, No. UNPF Z-1082, 01/07/95.1815 NIOD, Coll. Sitreps, HQ Dutchbat to Sector HQ North-East, Sitrep for period 041700 to 051700B Jul 95.1816 ICTY (IT-98-33) OTP Ex. 403/a, 28 th Division Combat Report, No. 01-161/95, 05/07/95. Butler Report, p. 17. In areport of 6 July as well, the 28 th Division indicated that a strong concentration of tanks and artillery had been seen theprevious day. See also: Collection NIOD, Collection CD-ROMs, Komanda 28. Divizije to Komanda 2. Korpusa, Str. pov.br. 01-163/95, 06/07/95.1817 NIOD, Coll. CD-ROMs. ABiH 28. Divizije to Komanda 2. Korpusa, odjeljenje bezbjednosti, General Stab ARBiHUprava bezbjednosti, Str. Pov. Broj. 13-05, 06/07/95.