C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

160The choice of TuzlaVarious European countries meanwhile became increasingly suspicious concerning the expanding armssupplies to Croatia and Bosnia. Little credence was attached to the assertions that Washington hadnothing to do with them. There was a suspicion that one of the US intelligence services had receivedthe green light to set up an operation for which assent was probably sought and obtained in from theRepublicans. 787 Tuzla was chosen for the supplies to East Bosnia. This was logical. Dubrava airport hadbeen in use as a Yugoslav Army military airfield until 18 May 1992. The airfield had better facilities thanSarajevo, it was at a lower altitude (237 metres) and climatologically it was a better location, whichassured the pilots of better visibility during takeoff and landing.Tuzla Air Base (TAB) was one of the largest airfields and the most important airfield in EastBosnia. It was said to have been used by the ABiH for covert operations with helicopters aroundSrebrenica.788 Another reason for using Tuzla was probably that the transit of arms to the ABiH in EastBosnia, which were delivered via Croatia or to Visoko airfield, presented too many problems. TAB wasleased by UNPROFOR from the Bosnian government on 7 March 1994. Akashi opened it on 22March, but after 39 flights the airfield was closed again on 31 May 1994 because the VRS wereunwilling to guarantee the safety of the aircraft. 789The UN controlled the largest runway (Tuzla Main) which was 2300 metres long and 8 km tothe southeast of Tuzla, but exercised no control over the other three runways, which were not close toeach other. The most important of them was without doubt the Tuzla Highway Strip, approximately 6km to the south of Tuzla Main. This runway was approximately 1800 metres long. Tuzla East wasapproximately 1.5 km further to the east of the Highway Strip, and was a grass track approximately1100 metres long. Finally, there was Tuzla West with a runway of approximately 2 km, but, to allappearances, this could not be used because there were large piles of earth on it. As it happens, anUNPROFOR worker stated that Tuzla West certainly could be used: according to him the piles ofearth were removed after dark, so that small aircraft could land and the arms could be transportedfurther. 790 The advantage of using the three runways other than Tuzla Main was that they were out ofsight of the VRS, and also outside VRS artillery range. 791The equipment that was delivered in Tuzla consisted mainly of quick-firing weapons,ammunition, uniforms, helmets, new anti-tank weapons and Stingers. The archive of the 281st ABiHBrigade in Zepa reveals that much military equipment was delivered from Tuzla by helicopter for Zepa,largely to be forwarded in transit from there to Srebrenica. The ABiH commander of Zepa reported,for example, that on 14 February 1995, a few days after the first observations of the Black Flights, fortymachine guns were transported by air, some of which were to be brought to Srebrenica. The VRS didfire on the helicopter, but without result. At the same time, the flight delivered DM 308,000. Thecommander of Zepa did not know what he was supposed to do with this money, but he assumed that itwas destined for the 28th Division in Srebrenica.Two days later, on 16 February, an ABiH helicopter was hit by VRS anti-aircraft fire. 792 Theincreasing number of helicopter flights with military equipment not only to Zepa, but also directly toSrebrenica, led to an order from the Drina Corps to various VRS units to shoot down these aircraft. 793In mid April, the ABiH commander of Zepa gave a summary of what he had received by air and whathad been forwarded in transit to Srebrenica. Zepa had received the following items: 23,500 7.62 mmcalibre cartridges, 15 mines (82 mm), 25 mines (60 mm), 4 TF-8 rockets, 34 B.R. M-93 machine guns787 Confidential interview (11).788 ‘Tanjug details Muslim ‘secret operation’ to down air-drop planes’, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 01/03/93.789 Confidential collection (12), Memo from Le Hardy to Brigadier Ridderstad, ‘Tuzla Airbase - The Rationale’, 29/01/95.790 Confidential interview (45).791 Confidential collection (12), ‘Reports of Possible Fixed Wing Flight Activity at Tuzla 10/12 Feb 95’, 18/02/95.792 NIOD, Coll. Ivanisovic. Avdo Palic, Zepa to Enver Hadzihasanovic, Sarajevo, Broj:08--20-114/95, 11/02/95, Broj:08--20-129/95, 14/02/95, Broj:08--20-140/95, 16/02/95 and Broj:08--20-141/95, 16/02/95.793 ICTY, Krstic Trial, Order Supreme Command of the Drina Corps, no. 08/8-15, 25/02/95.