C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

118An US intelligence official rejected vehemently the idea that intelligence was doctored forpolitical reasons. According to this source, it may well be that the information was sometimesincomplete or incorrect, and for that one must make accounts for human error. But to attribute theerrors to some vast political conspiracy is ‘absurd’. The same official also remarked somewhat offendedthat the intelligence staff of the US Joint Analysis Center (JAC) at Molesworth would have welcomedany constructive criticism from a Dutch analytical cell. The staff did frequently get analytical assistancefrom other nationalities, which led to better, more useful products for all involved. To the best of hisknowledge, any improvements made by any Dutch analysts were kept to themselves. And if it was nogood according to this Dutch source, the US official asked, what did they do about it? Where did theygo to get what they needed? Did they explore bilateral avenues? Did they advise higher authority of theshortfall? Did they do anything about it, or did ‘they go back to their cup of coffee, and show up sourgrapes after the fact?’ 549But Dutch intelligence officials persisted that thanks to thorough analysis, the Balkans Sectionof the MIS/Air Force discovered matters that had escaped the notice of others. For instance, theanalysts determined that in early 1995, French Mirage aircraft had flown a secret mission from Franceand bombed Pale. UNPROFOR was not informed of this. 5508. Support for the MIS from UNPROFORAt the MIS/CO, MIS/Army and MIS/Air Force it was completely clear that nothing could be expectedof the UN in the area of intelligence gathering. This had already been made clear to the Dutch in thepeacekeeping operation in Cambodia in 1992-1993. Even simple aerial photographs were frownedupon by the UN. It was established that the Dutch battalion had too few intelligence officers to gatherinformation systematically itself.At the time, the battalion commander in Cambodia had already established that he might havebeen able to obtain more knowledge from Sigint, but that Humint was what was really needed in apeacekeeping operation: ‘If you have dealings with four factions who are unreliable or are unable todescribe the situation in the field, then you have to have an intelligence service of your own’. 551 TheNetherlands Ministry of Defence apparently drew no conclusions from this. In mid 1995, it was againobserved in a Defence Intelligence Requirements memorandum that the lack of adequate securityguarantees meant that the countries participating in UN operations were extremely reluctant to issueintelligence to the UN or the nations participating in UN operations. 552 Couzy was often described ashaving little or no interest in intelligence on this aspect. He never asked for special intelligencebriefings. The assessment of the then head of his private office was that ‘Couzy easily distances himselffrom matters he thinks others ought to take care of’. He stated that Couzy attached great importance tomilitary security, but that he did not associate this with an additional intelligence effort. 553Nonetheless, Couzy too knew that the UN had no intelligence service of its own, because ‘theywere not there to fight. They were there for a humanitarian operation, for which you do not need anintelligence service’. The question is whether such an assessment is correct. According to many, goodintelligence is also absolutely necessary for the satisfactory execution of humanitarian operations. It isessential to gather intelligence on such important issues as the manning of roadblocks, the condition ofroads, the attitude of the warring parties, the situation on the ground, whether the local mafia is playinga role in the distribution of aid, the involvement of paramilitary units, and the extent to which aceasefire is being upheld. In a nutshell, intelligence is of great importance to peacekeeping operations549 Confidential information (80).550 Confidential interview (31).551 Bais, Het mijnenveld van een vredesmacht, pp. 83 - 85.552 MoD, Archive MIS/Air Force, CASS No. 49, File Reports DB, Letter + Appendix I, No. DIS/95/24.1/1486, 22/06/95.553 Interview with H. Bosch, 10/10/01. For example, there was also no exchange of information between Couzy and the Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff. Couzy never asked to bebriefed. Interview with M.C.J. Felix, 06/04/00.