C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

249made by Krstic and other Bosnian Serbs – why did they not loudly announce this to the world in thesummer of 1995? It is after all very hard to believe that the Bosnian signals services would have listenedin ‘live’ to the killing of their friends, colleagues and perhaps even members of their family withoutraising the alarm. To be sure, world-wide publication of these intercepted messages might have saved alot of lives and prompted the Bosnian Serbs to halt their atrocities. Before addressing these questionsand drawing conclusions it is important to shed light on the intelligence capacity and the targets of thehostile parties.Section 2 will discuss the Signals Intelligence (Sigint) operations of the VJ and the VRS; it willdescribe the resources that the Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs had at their disposal, the ways in whichthey cooperated and the ABiH communication traffic that was intercepted by the Sigint units of the VJand the VRS. The VJ and the VRS will be discussed in the same section because many documents andinterviews have revealed that they cooperated closely on this type of intelligence.Section 3 will concentrate on the Sigint operations of the ABiH. These appeared to be of highquality,as demonstrated by the tape produced at the trial of General Krstic. It will also describe whichBosnian-Serb communication traffic the ABiH was able to intercept. Section 4 will answer the pressingquestion of whether the ABiH was able to follow these conversations in real time. In other words, werethe intercepted messages and conversations directly available to the recipients of the intelligenceproduct? And, if so, why did the Bosnian politicians and military commanders then decide to donothing with this highly volatile intercepted communication? Why did they keep it under wraps andonly reveal it years later to the researchers of the Yugoslavia Tribunal in The Hague?This section will also deal with the exchange of Comint with UNPROFOR. Between 1992 and1995 the ABiH and the Bosnian politicians wanted more western involvement in the war on theground. They could have achieved this by throwing their intercepts into ‘the fight’ at UNPROFOR, butthey would have had to be able to produce them at that moment, specifically those on the attack onSrebrenica and the flight to Tuzla by the Muslim soldiers. The VRS and ABiH had each other asComint target. However, all the warring factions, including the VJ, also had a common target, namely,UNPROFOR units in general and Dutchbat in Srebrenica in particular. Section 5 will thereforeconsider UNPROFOR and Dutchbat as a Comint target for all the warring factions. Section 6 will drawsome conclusions on this local Sigint war.2. The Signals Intelligence War of the VJ and the VRSThe following extract is taken from a secret the British report of August 1995.‘The former Yugoslavia had a considerable Signals Intelligence organization.The present location of Signals Intelligence assets cannot be accuratelyascertained, but it must be assumed that all three Warring Factions have anintercept capability. There are recorded examples of limited Warring Factionintercept and jamming against UN troops. The Communications Interceptsthreat has to be considered medium to high’. 1313It appears therefore that UNPROFOR knew about the excellent Sigint operations and capacity of theVJ. Certain background details can be established about this capacity. 1314The VJ (formerly the JNA) set great store by Sigint materiel and capabilities during the ColdWar. In the 1980s the equipment was radically modernized to bring it up to western standards. Thismodernization programme took place under the code name Arios. Between 1989 and 1991 the VJ1313 UNGE, UNPROFOR, File RRFOS/2300-3 Opsec, Memorandum RRFOS, 25/07/95 and 08/09/95.1314 The information which follows on the Sigint of the VJ is taken from confidential interviews (5), (6) and (73) and theMoD, MIS, Report by the Dutch NIC, 04/02/99. The information dates from October 1998. See also:http://www.vj.yu/vojska_e/struktura/vidovi/kov/.