C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

61as a counterweight to sound a balanced note. For the press this confirmed the image of SIS as pro-Serbian, and from that moment on this service was unreservedly branded as ‘pro-Serbian’, while manyBritish journalists followed the CNN view (‘good guys, bad guys’) of the war. 261For instance, anti-Serbian reports were shown on television of the battle around Gorazde inApril-May 1994, according to the former American head of the intelligence section (in military terms:the G-2 section) in Sarajevo, Lieutenant Colonel J. E. Sray. A British SAS soldier was killed by the VRSand a British aircraft (a Sea Harrier) was shot down. US networks accused General Rose of cowardiceand reluctance to deploy NATO air power against the Bosnian Serbs. What was not mentioned ontelevision, however, was that ABiH soldiers had left their positions during the VRS attack and taken upnew positions behind the SAS unit, which caught the British in the middle. No one took the trouble tomake enquiries of the Public Affairs Officer of Bosnia-Hercegovina Command (BHC), or to request aninterview with UNPROFOR staff in Sarajevo. In later documentaries this story would indiscriminatelybe repeated on American television. 262 More generally, the press in the crisis around Bosnia wastransformed from mere opinion shapers into prominent policy drivers who, depending on the situation,had an influence on the political decision-making that should not be underestimated. 263 This is not theappropriate place to give a comprehensive analysis of the role of and reporting by the press on the warin Bosnia, but it is clear that this helped to shape a manifestly pro-Muslim view. 264Another example of misleading information was probably the mortar attack on the Markalemarket in Sarajevo, which killed 68 civilians in February 1994. Eleven artillery specialists subsequentlyspent nine days studying the shell attack. 265 The official final assessment was that the attacks wereexecuted by the VRS, but there were serious doubts about this within the Western intelligencecommunity. Various staff of intelligence and security services from Canada, the UK, Denmark,Sweden, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands established independently of each other that this wasan act by the ABiH to show the Bosnian Serbs in a bad light. 266A similar suspicion arose when on 28 August 1995 a shell landed on a busy square in Sarajevo.As early as October 1995 journalist David Binder reported in the weekly The Nation that fourUNPROFOR specialists (a Russian, a Canadian and two Americans) had arrived at the incontrovertibleconclusion that it was an ABiH shell. American intelligence officers admitted that the ABiH had takenresponsibility for this incident. 267 Sray, head of the intelligence section in Sarajevo, subsequentlysignalled in a publication that the ABiH was responsible for both shellings. 268 Even the most importantBritish policy body in the field of intelligence, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), came to theconclusion that the shelling of Sarajevo market was probably not the work of the VRS, but of theBosnian Muslims. 269In a third incident that followed this pattern, the head of the UNMOs (UN Military Observers)in Sarajevo investigated the mortar attack on the water distribution point in Sarajevo, which was thetrigger for the later air strikes by NATO, and in doing so demonstrated that the attack was executed bythe ABiH itself. However, all the associated evidence was pushed aside by American officers. 270 Russian261 Dorril, MI 6, 2000, p. 791.262 John Sray, ‘selling the Bosnian Myth’, in: Foreign Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 1995. OtherAmerican, Canadian and European intelligence officials repeatedly expressed their dislike of CNN reports. Confidentialinterviews (9), (12), (47) and (54).263 Drs. R. Theunens, ‘Intelligence en vredesoperaties’ (‘Intelligence and peace operations’), Militaire Spectator, 170 (2001) 11,p. 599.264 See also the Scholten appendix to the main report.265 David Binder, ‘Bosnia’s bombers’, The Nation, Vol. 261, No. 10, 02/10/95.266 Confidential interviews (8), (9), (12), (21), (37), (44), (45), (47), (68) and (69).267 Confidential interview (54).268 John Sray, ‘selling the Bosnian Myth’, in: Foreign Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 1995.269 Confidential interview (8).270 Confidential interview (44).