C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

317the VRS attack should aim to take over the entire enclave. This aspect of self-generated noise was,according to Metselaar, actually the logical consequence of the fact that Dutchbat had been a ‘hostage’of the VRS for a longer period. The Serbs had always been in a position to take over the enclave; whyshould that suddenly happen now? Both UNPROFOR and The Hague assumed that the VRS ‘wouldnot dare to go to such brutality and thereby provoke the whole international community’. It was viewedas totally inconceivable that Mladic would in fact do precisely this.The policymakers clung to belief systems: a cohesive collection of views, convictions and valuesthat have adopted an influential position in one’s thinking. These belief systems form a filter in theperception of reality and the corresponding statements one makes. Here, reality is not determined bythe actual situation but by the picture that those involved have formed of it. They try for as long aspossible to perceive their surroundings in the most cohesive way possible and to avoid certaincontradictions. Many tend to avoid what is known as ‘cognitive dissonance’ (the tension between newinformation and established ways of thinking). 1743 A study of the operations in Somalia, for instance,showed that important ‘intelligence indicators were not assessed and analysed from first principles butwere rather conveniently tailored to fit around what was wanted to be believed’. 1744Another aspect of self-generated noise is the exaggerated value assigned to air power. It waslong assumed that this would prove a sufficient deterrent to the VRS. After the fall one of Akashi’sadvisers stated: ‘The magic of air power is gone.’ 1745 Self-generated noise can also occur if the analyst‘allows his own cultural background to influence the result rather than the culture, ideology, society andlogic of the country concerned, giving rise to the Mirror Image phenomenon’. This refers to theinability to understand that the opposing party would act differently to the way the analyst himselfwould act. Decision-makers often tend to report the events that confirm their predictions and ‘ignorethose that fail to conform’. 1746On the basis of the information available at the time, Metselaar concluded in 1997 that the wayin which warnings of a VRS attack were handled can be regarded as an intelligence failure. At the sametime he asks how great the failure was and to what extent it also explained the later tragic events. ‘Couldit be possible that the lack of capabilities and (probably even more importantly) the lack of willingnessof (most if not all) members of the international community (at least until the end of July 1995) weremore crucial?’ In other words: would the result have been different if the indications and intelligencehad been taken more seriously? 1747One important question is whether there were sufficient intelligence capabilities to perceive thepreparations in time. It is often assumed that a surprise attack is able to take place because enemypreparations are not discovered early enough to sound the alarm. According to the author Brady,history shows that in many successful surprise attacks the attacked party had enough information tomake an accurate prediction of the enemy’s intentions. The problem was that the signals were ignoredor interpreted wrongly. 1748 Preventing a surprise attack is ‘not simply a problem of detection, but verymuch a problem of assessment and acceptance’. The Argentinean attack on the Falkland Islands canserve as an example. Despite many warnings, the British government did not believe that Argentinawould attack the islands. In turn, the Argentineans did not believe either that the United Kingdomwould take the trouble to regain the territory. 1749Previous chapters have described the resources and capabilities deployed by the internationalintelligence and security services in Bosnia. Attention has been given to the resources at the disposal of1743 Van Staden, De fuik, p. 10.1744 Connaughton, Military Intervention, p. 127.1745 UNNY, ICFY, SRSG, Mark Baskin to Akashi, ‘How is the Fall of Srebrenica a Turning point for the Mission’,14/07/95.1746 Välimäki, Intelligence, p. 37 and 41.1747 Metselaar, ‘Understanding Failures in Intelligence’, p. 46.1748 Christopher Brady, ‘Intelligence Failures: Plus Ç Change …’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 8 (1993) 4 , p. 86.1749 Gordon H. McCormick, ‘surprise, Perceptions, and Military Style’, Orbis, Vol. 26 (1983) 4, pp. 836-837.