C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

127Department, the Counterintelligence Bureau and Military Security personnel communicated with eachother through informal channels because nothing could be exchanged officially. 601One Military Security official was responsible for deployments to peacekeeping operations, atask which made up approximately 90% of his work. The Military Security Section took particularnotice of conduct. The same was incidentally true of the Counterintelligence Bureau, but its approachwas considerably influenced by its ‘old’ background. The Counterintelligence Bureau wanted to concernitself with deployments, and pay special attention to issues like threats, risks and preservation ofintegrity. This was not allowed and as a result, a considerable amount of security information remainedwithin the confines of the Military Security Bureau, according to an official 602 of the CounterintelligenceBureau. There was a built-in mechanism for drawing a discrete veil over many issues.The impression at the MIS/CO was that the main concern of the Military Security Section wasto protect the image of the Army. All the MIS/CO was allowed to do was brief and debrief UNMOs,Royal Netherlands Marechaussee personnel that had worked for UNCivPol, and personnel from theEuropean monitoring mission. The problem here was again that these were often Army people, whotherefore had no wish to cooperate. The Marechaussee also resisted the involvement of theCounterintelligence Bureau. Dutchbat was claimed completely by the Military Security Bureau. TheMIS/CO Counterintelligence Bureau was not allowed access. Its head was explicitly told so on twooccasions: not a single Dutchbat soldier may be approached. Involvement with the big debriefing inAssen after the fall of Srebrenica was also forbidden. The Counterintelligence Bureau was allowed topass on questions to MIS/Army’s Military Security Bureau, who then reported back on the intelligence603gathered, but no direct access to Dutchbat was given.This restricted access probably influenced the investigation into extreme right-wing statementsor behaviour. From early 1993, a specific request was made to the Armed Forces and the RoyalNetherlands Marechaussee to report such matters to the Counterintelligence Bureau. In the case ofdeployments within the framework of peacekeeping operations steps had to be taken to prevent thepersonal conduct of the personnel having repercussions on the duties of the deployed unit. It wasnecessary to identify defence personnel who were members of extreme right-wing organizations andfactions, and record any incidents, which had taken place. In March 1993, the Head of the MIS, Duijn,gave his approval to the ‘Extreme Right Project’, and from that moment the CounterintelligenceBureau would specifically map this area out within the framework of the project. 604The MIS/CO was in no way involved in the deployment of Dutchbat. This was done by theMilitary Security Bureau. The Counterintelligence Bureau did not consider secretly building up its owninformation network. There was some internal discussion, but the fear of being compromised was toogreat. The Counterintelligence Bureau did occasionally have access to Dutch officers that had workedat BHC. The Counterintelligence Bureau, like the Operations Department, was also interested ininterpreters and translators. An attempt was made to monitor them within UNPROFOR. Theseinterpreters often worked for Balkans intelligence services, and they turned up in various places inBosnia.Involvement in controversial incidentsThe Counterintelligence Bureau was also involved in the tins of rice affair. The tins were used in anattempt by Bosnian Muslims living in Germany to smuggle money to Muslims in Srebrenica. This wasdiscovered when a package was sent to a Dutchbat sergeant who had already left. The package wasthen opened, and it was decided to distribute the tins among the Displaced Persons. Several tins werevery underweight, and once they were opened, it turned out that they contained documents and money.601 Confidential interviews (18 ) , ( 19 ) , ( 20 ) and ( 31).602 Confidential interview (19).603 Confidential interview (19).604 MoD, Archive MIS/CO, Memorandum for HMID, No. BCI/224/930558, 10/03/93.