C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

191the warring factions, namely that the international community was not prepared to put serious effortinto this issue. 1017The influence of the supplies was also felt in East Bosnia when in April 1995 the ABiH Springoffensive started. The ABiH in Srebrenica also received new arms. It has been demonstrated that theclandestine supplies usually led to rapid transit by helicopter to the eastern enclaves such as Srebrenicaand Zepa. New arms generally facilitated new sorties from the enclaves into Bosnian-Serb villages andmilitary positions, which in turn provoked a response from the VRS. This sometimes put Dutchsoldiers in danger, because in the enclaves the ABiH all too often used Dutchbat’s OPs as cover inmilitary actions against the VRS. 1018 Therefore the enclave increasingly acquired the status of a‘protected area’ for the ABiH, from which the ABiH could carry out hit and run operations against,often civilian, targets. These operations probably contributed to the fact that at the end of June theVRS was prepared to take no more, after which they decided to intervene: the VRS decided shortlyafter to capture the enclave.In this respect, the Black Flights to Tuzla and the sustained arms supplies to the ABiH in theeastern enclaves did perhaps contribute to the ultimate decision to attack the enclave. In thisconnection it is not surprising that Mladic and other Bosnian Serbs constantly complained about this,but usually received no response to their complaints.1019 In the eyes of the VRS, the complaints wereperhaps justified, but it must not be forgotten that UNPROFOR did not have the mandate to opposethe supplies. In fact the sanctions and the arms embargo had little substance. At most, the flow ofarms, ammunition, resources, oil and other goods was reduced somewhat. The smuggling tradeflourished, and otherwise organized international criminals, including Russians, ensured sufficientsupply. 1020 The border between Serbia and Srpska over the Drina may well have been monitored by theICFY mission, but this check was far from watertight.Smuggling operations from Serbia to Srpska took place daily. There were perhaps too fewobservers to man all the crossings, but neither did any major supplies of tanks, APCs and artillery takeplace, as the Bosnian Muslims claimed. There was cooperation from the Yugoslav authorities, becauseBelgrade had much to lose in the event of excessively visible violations of the embargo. The UNheadquarters in Zagreb did hear constant rumours of support of the VJ, but hard evidence of it wasnever received.1021 Secret UN documents, to which the media referred and that indicated that the VRSwas receiving ‘high-level military support’ from the VJ and that personnel and equipment was beingsupplied across the Drina 1022 , were not found by the NIOD in the UN archives. The conclusion wastherefore that there was Serbian involvement in the war in Bosnia in 1995, but not in a direct way. Themilitary infrastructure of the old Yugoslavia was still largely intact; the Serbian assistance related tologistics support, components, payment of officers’ salaries and communications. 1023From the American side it was confirmed that no evidence was ever supplied that arms went tothe Bosnian Serbs across the Drina. The road via Croatia was open, however. The conclusion thereforewas that the embargo along the Drina was ‘fairly effective’, albeit not watertight. 1024 There was anotherWestern intelligence service that never had hard evidence in the period before the fall of Srebrenica ofthe VRS receiving arms from the VJ, but it still cannot be ruled out completely. 1025 In addition, theICFY mission had to contend with a formidable opponent in the form of Kertis, who is described by1017 Filippo Andreatta, The Bosnian War and the New World Order, WEU Occasional Paper No. 1, October 1996, p. 14.1018 For example: UNNY, DPKO coded cables De Lapresle to Annan, Z-528, 04/04/94.1019 For this: see also Chapter 8 of this study and especially Part III of the Srebrenica report.1020 William C. Potter, Djuro Miljanic & Ivo Slaus, ‘Tito’s Nuclear Legacy’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56 (2000), 2, pp.63-75.1021 Interview with Tony Banbury, 11/05/00.1022 See: ‘Documentary alleges Serbian Arms Used to Invade Srebrenica’, ANP English News Bulletin, 30/05/95 and Reuter,29/05/96.1023 Interview with R.A. Smith, 12/01/00. Smith did not rely on intelligence reports from UNPROFOR.1024 Confidential interview (14).1025 Confidential interview (8).