C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

297available. 1606 The head of the intelligence section in Zagreb, the Swedish Colonel Jan-Inge Svensson,and his assistant Lieutenant Colonel Ingmar Ljunggren also occasionally received photos fromPredators after mid-July. Other intelligence from Predators was also phoned through to them afteranalysis. They had never seen photos taken by German UAVs. The analyses of photos and otherintelligence from satellites or the U-2 Dragon Lady were always passed on to them by word of mouth.As Sweden was not a NATO member, neither Swede ever actually saw the Imint. 1607So, many UNPROFOR officials in Zagreb had access to Imint: sometimes in the form ofwritten reports. One member of the UNPROFOR staff even recalled that the first aerial photos ofsuspected mass graves and relating excavations were available a few days after the fall of Srebrenica. 1608However, requests from SNE for Imint were to no avail. On 21, 22, 24, 26 and 29 April, GeneralHaukland repeatedly and urgently requested satellite or other aerial photos of areas where the BosnianSerbs were operational. NATO never even acknowledged his requests and Haukland never received thephotos. 1609 When the Dutch Minister Jan Pronk confronted General Nicolai about this during a visit toBosnia in July 1995, he was told that troops from a non-NATO state (Pakistan) were manning thereception station for the requested photos. 1610 If that was the case, then UNPROFOR should haveintervened. After all, a station is useless if the personnel stationed there are not authorized to receiveImint. It might have been better at the time to deputize a US intelligence officer with secureconnections to Haukland’s staff in Tuzla. This example is a further indication that neitherUNPROFOR nor NATO accorded high priority to Eastern Bosnia.Initially, the Americans shared their photos with The Hague (probably from U-2s), but that wasduring the Dutch presidency of the European Union. Later on, they only shared them for the purposesof planning a possible joint emergency helicopter evacuation of Dutchbat from Srebrenica. But this wasmonths before the attack.1611Canada was probably the only ally with whom the Americans sharedeverything. The intelligence analysts at the Canadian Ministry of Defence had permanent access toimagery and other intelligence (raw as well as finished). The Canadian intelligence community inSarajevo – and also in Zagreb – had access to Imint in their own intelligence cells. This was mostlycurrent near-real-time Imint.There was also Satint available on Eastern Bosnia which occasionally showed VRS troopmovements. The Canadian intelligence cell in Bosnia itself had near-real-time Imint which was aboutfive days old. Sometimes it had been processed, but the Canadian officers could always get archivalImint. The Canadian intelligence cell in Bosnia never received Imint on Croatia from the Americans.The British community also had some idea of the events around Srebrenica through Imint.According to an official of the UK intelligence community, most of the information on the troopbuild-up came from Imint. It never emerged whether this came from satellites or U-2s. Anyway, Imintdelivered pictures of VRS troop concentrations, though it did not show that the VRS was preparing tolaunch an attack. Eventually, this was also concluded by the UK Defence Intelligence Staff. 1613 TheBritish services also categorically insisted that Srebrenica was not an important area, not even for theDIS, which had focused all its attention on Gorazde and Sarajevo. 161416121606 Confidential information (80).1607 Interview Jan-Inge Svensson and Ingmar Ljunggren, 04/11/99.1608 Confidential information (58).1609 Interview V. Haukland, 22/09/00.1610 NIOD, Letter from J. Pronk to NIOD, 29/05/01; NMFA, DMP to R, draft report of the trip by J. Pronk to Tuzla andSarajevo, NH-618/95, 31/07/95.1611 Interviews with M.J.C. Felix, 06/04/00 and A.M. van der Togt, 04/05/00.1612 Confidential interviews (9), (47), (62) and (90).1613 The question of ‘Foreknowledge’ will be addressed in detail in the following chapter.1614 Confidential interview (8).