C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

76Forces were said to have received permission to use UNHCR jeeps with special number plates for theiroperations. 360 According to an internal investigation by UNHCR in May 1993, the Bosnian Muslimsalso repeatedly smuggled ammunition in aid convoys. For instance, 30,000 American camouflageuniforms were said to have been transported by the UNHCR to the ABiH 2nd Corps. 361 A load ofweapons and ammunition was also discovered in an aid convoy of the Caritas organization on the wayto Busovaca in March 1993. Whether this was a deliberate Bosnian-Serb attempt to discreditUNPROFOR, or a similar attempt by the Bosnian Croats, remained unclear. 362 The VRS was later todiscover DM 30,000 in an NGO convoy bound for Gorazde. 363According to an UNMO official, from an intelligence point of view, ‘the most interesting’organizations were the NGOs. Personnel of NGOs were therefore often recruited by intelligenceservices, because a variety of relief organizations were able to travel to provide humanitarian aid inareas that were closed to the outside world. Meanwhile, the ABiH also drove around in trucks markedwith NGO stickers, and which proclaimed ‘scottish European Aid’, ‘UNHCR’, or ‘European Aid’. 364An American intelligence service even recruited agents in one of the NGOs that worked inSrebrenica. 365 It also became evident during the fall of Srebrenica that NGOs and a variety of otherrelief organizations supplied reliable intelligence. Officials from the American intelligence communitydeclared at the time that ‘their best information came from human rights groups, the United Nationsand the press, not from spies, satellites or eavesdropping’. 366In other words, many intelligence services in particular were represented in UNPROFOR invarious cities and areas in Bosnia. However, the above also reveals that the American services were notthe only ones that were active. Other services likewise had sources and agents locally, and this was alsotrue of intelligence services from countries like Russia, Turkey, Greece and Iran. The functions of thesenational elements were often unrelated to any support to an UN agenda. These nationalities worked tosupport their own agenda’s, and some of those interests overlapped with on-going Western efforts.However, where it made good sense to do so, some cooperation with these services was permitted on acase-by-case basis. Whether this was also true of the Dutch intelligence community will be discussed inthe next chapter. After all, it is relevant to know whether the Dutch intelligence and security serviceswere also active in this grand intelligence ‘theme park’. How well prepared was the Netherlands in thearea of Humint, Sigint and Osint? Did it have sufficient technical, personnel and financial resources to‘tackle’ the crisis in Bosnia and to provide Dutchbat with sufficient intelligence support?5. ConclusionsThe UN was extremely wary of active and focused gathering of intelligence, and UNPROFOR itself asan organization had no well-organized structure for gathering intelligence. This meant almostautomatically that not only the United States, but also the countries that contributed troops to thispeacekeeping operation, started to gather intelligence independently. This was carried out not only bythe intelligence services from the different national capitals, but also in the region itself. By harnessingall possible resources and deploying more people, the services tried to gain a view of the political,economic and military developments in the region. As described above, there were initially a variety ofteething troubles, which were psychological, political, structural and technical in nature.360 Harald Doornbos, ‘Groene spionnen tussen blauwhelmen’ (‘Green spies among blue helmets’), De Stem, 10/05/95. Seealso: US Special Operations Command, 10 th Anniversary History, MacDill AFB, Florida, 1997, pp. 52-55.361 MoD, MIS/CO, Developments in the former Yugoslav federation, no. 32/93, 10/05/93 and 101. MISCie. Van Jawad toHakort, debriefing report 101 MIScie, 23/12/95.362 MoD, MIS/CO, Developments in the former Yugoslav federation, no. 18/93, 25/03/93.363 Corwin, Dubious Mandate, p. 183.364 UNGE, UNPROFOR, No. 330-6, G-2 HQ SNE to BHC, Zagreb, no. 2725, 08/01/95.365 Confidential interview (54).366 Stephen Engelberg & Tim Weiner, ‘The Days of Slaughter’, The New York Times, 29/10/95.