C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

313Chapter 8Was ‘Srebrenica’ an intelligence failure?1. Introduction‘Gentlemen, I notice that there are always three courses (of action)open to an enemy and that he usually takes the fourth.’- General Helmuth von Moltke‘Intelligence did not prepare us adequately for the attack onSrebrenica.’- Richard Holbrooke. 1720‘Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more arefalse, and most are uncertain and in short, most intelligence is false.’- Carl von Clausewitz. 1721Ever since the fall of Srebrenica there has been speculation about prior knowledge of the VRS attack.The Dutch Nova current affairs programme, for instance, revealed on 11 July 2000 that on 8 June 1995the DutchBat commander Karremans had sent a warning to the Netherlands Ministry of Defencestating that he expected a major attack. Large troop concentrations and special combat troops had beenreported around the enclave. This warning was apparently ignored and no further action was taken.Moreover, the Deputy Commander in Chief of the Royal Netherlands Army General Ad Van Baal didnot consider it necessary to inform Defence Minister Voorhoeve about this. A Ministry of Defencespokesman referred the matter to the UN: according to him it was this organization that should haveacted on the information, not the Army. But according to the report UNPROFOR did nothing withthis information from Karremans. 1722This NOVA report can be seen as a late echo (prompted by a newly discovered document) ofconcerns that had already been raised in 1995. In earlier years it had been the press that had containedmost of the speculation on this matter. It was claimed that in June 1995 American and Germanintelligence services had spectacular evidence that the Bosnian Serbs were planning to take the enclave:it was reported that as early as three weeks before the dramatic fall, the US government was alreadyinformed of the details. Washington, it was said, did not want to share this prior knowledge of theattack with the UN. As already discussed in the previous chapter, spy aircraft and satellites reportedlyphotographed the fleet of dozens of buses that were to be used to transport the Displaced Personsafter the fall of Srebrenica. In the process, journalists wrote, they could hardly have overlooked thetanks and artillery pieces at Zeleni Jadar. 17231720 Roy Gutman, ‘UN’s Deadly Deal’, Newsday, 29/05/96.1721 Howard and Paret (ed), Clausewitz von, Carl: On War, p.117.1722 ‘Alarm Karremans over enclave werd genegeerd’ (Karremans’ alarm for the enclave was ignored), De Volkskrant,12/07/00. Also the VPRO radio programme Argos, Radio 1, 11.00-12.00, 02/07/01. In fact, in Chapter 5 of Part III of theSrebrenica report it was proven that Voorhoeve was indeed informed.1723 ‘VS wisten al weken tevoren van val Srebrenica’ (US knew about Srebrenica weeks in advance), De Gelderlander,13/10/95; Bert Steinmetz, ‘Voorhoeve door VS fout ingelicht’ (Voorhoeve wrongly informed by US), Het Parool, 15/05/96;Westerman & Rijs, Het Zwartste Scenario, pp. 149-150.