C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

231‘They more or less admitted they were holding stuff back from us; noteverything, but really the bits relating to most pronounced political divide. Theydidn’t feel we took their information about Serb atrocities seriously enough (…)They pushed the stuff which favoured more punitive action against the BosnianSerbs’. 1225In other words, the Americans did not cut off the flow of intelligence completely, but it was graduallyreduced. In fact, US ideas for a solution to the Bosnian conflict failed not only to meet with theapproval of the British, but also not with the approval of the Canadians and the French for instance.This led to considerable mistrust on the part of the Americans. The consequences were wide ranging:UN traffic became a Sigint target for the NSA. This involved the communications between the militaryand civil UNPROFOR representatives in Bosnia.The headquarters of Bosnia Hercegovina Command (BHC) in Sarajevo and of UNPF in Zagrebwere notorious for their ‘near stone age communications’. Generally speaking both headquarterscommunicated with each other or with the UN via Inmarsat or via the non-secure satellite telephones(VSAT). Moreover, there were initially just four channels available for the entire BHC. According tointelligence experts the UN communications were monitored ‘as a matter of course’. 1226 There wasalmost no encryption equipment for links with New York and Zagreb, just a few purely nationalsatellite lines in BHC and the American STU-III satellite telephone for the contacts with NATO inItaly. When General Smith left Sarajevo, for instance, then US Special Forces providedcommunications with a mobile satellite telephone. This meant, however, that the American serviceswere able to listen in to what Smith discussed on the telephone, and this is just what they did, asStankovic revealed in his book. 1227Moreover, Smith’s staff was convinced that most offices were bugged by Bosnian and Serbservices. Some suspected that the nearby US embassy also bugged their conversations. 1228 This certainlyseems possible because the embassy had a special Sigint cell of the NSA, the existence of which wasnot even known to the Chief of Station who was later assigned to the embassy. Moreover, USintelligence services operated from three containers at Smith’s Sarajevo headquarters: this involved aunit of the Special Collection Service. 1229 Smith himself regarded his surroundings as non-secure withregard to communications. This is why he did not often correspond with Zagreb. He also assumed thatmost conversations he conducted at his headquarters were bugged by the Bosnian IntelligenceService. 1230 Two studies issued by the headquarters of the British troops in Sarajevo, BritFor, in July andSeptember 1995 also assumed that all three of the warring parties had Sigint capabilities. These studiespointed out that the former Yugoslavia had possessed a substantial Sigint organization. Various caseshad been noted in which communications traffic to and from UN troops had been intercepted, orjammed. Consequently the Sigint threat was estimated as ranging ‘between medium and high’.As already described, most UN communications traffic was routed via Inmarsat and VSATsatellite telephones. According to the British, all links via VSAT, Inmarsat and the local post officetelephones were completely non-secure. The ‘Tempest’ threat was also rated as high; this involves thescanning of data emissions from computer screens, telephones and telephone cables in a given buildingfrom outside the building. In particular the non-secure UN telephones could be used by the warringfactions as a suitable means for monitoring data. It was thus recommended that computers bepositioned at least three metres away from non-secure telephones. Moreover, power cables and1225 Urban, UK Eyes, p. 241.1226 Confidential interviews (44) and (80). Also: Stankovic, Trusted Mole, p. 459.1227 Stankovic, Trusted Mole, pp. 250-252.1228 Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force, pp. 40-41.1229 Confidential interview (12).1230 Interview with R.A. Smith, 12/01/00.