C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

166February 1995. 833 According to Jones, neither were any visual observations made. This too conflictedwith Le Hardy’s report, which stated that various people had seen the wingtip lights.Jones pointed out further that a Jordanian unit that was stationed to the east of the Tuzla Westrunway had observed nothing. This was not so strange, because the Hercules had landed or dropped itsload on the Tuzla Highway Strip, which was approximately 10 km away from the Jordanian unit. Andas Le Hardy had already indicated in his report, it was deemed possible that a large aircraft had landedon the Tuzla Highway Strip without nearby OPs noticing, let alone the Jordanian unit 10 kilometresaway. According to Jones, the aircraft noises could be explained easily. This was ‘serbian airline traffic.’The flight movements and lights that had been seen were ‘consistent with the normal civilian airlinetraffic patterns in Serbian airspace’, according to Jones. This statement is extremely implausible: therewas actually a No Fly Zone above Bosnia, and Belgrade was far away from Tuzla. It is then illogical forregular Serbian commercial traffic to be flying so low, at a height of 300 metres over Tuzla. If that hadbeen true, the ABiH could have fired at those aircraft. Jones did not explain this, however.The sound of the cargo aircraft that different witnesses had heard could be explained, accordingto Jones, because they had been two A-6 E jet fighters. This too is peculiar, because the noise of anaircraft with four propellers is unmistakably different from that of a jet fighter. It was not evennecessary to be a practised observer to notice this such as the people who had seen and heard theHercules actually were.Other evidence for the Black Flight was that an UNPROFOR patrol had been fired on by theABiH when it wanted to inspect the Tuzla Highway Strip, but Jones apparently did not find thisunusual. He concluded that ‘there was no evidence that an aircraft landed or delivered any supplies byair at the Tuzla airfields’. This report was offered as a joint NATO/UNPROFOR investigation to thehighest NATO authority in the region, Admiral Smith, to Force Commander De Lapresle and toBosnia-Hercegovina Commander Rose. According to Jones, all the commanders agreed with theconclusion: there was no evidence that on 10 and 12 February ‘unauthorized air activity’ had takenplace over Tuzla. 834 An indication that the report left much to be desired was that a senior Frenchmilitary official even spoke of a forged NATO report. 835 However, the document was sent to the UNin New York and the Americans could be satisfied.The response from the UN in New YorkAnyone who thought that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations would easily accept thereassuring reports was in for a surprise. On 17 February, Akashi reported that there were discrepanciesbetween the UNPROFOR and NATO reports. 836 On 21 February, the political adviser to Boutros-Ghali, Ghinmaya Gharekhan, drafted a secret memo for Under-Secretary-General Annan, in which heindicated that the affair would come before the Security Council before too long: ‘For us to tell theSecurity Council that there was no evidence to suggest any unauthorized air activity would betantamount to saying that UNPROFOR should, in effect, stop reporting any air activity.’ ForceCommander De Lapresle had recently established helicopter flights from Zagreb to the Bihac, andGharekhan wondered rhetorically whether this would also be retracted.Gharekhan criticized the official NATO report and the explanations ‘such as there were’. He837wanted to know what that so-called regular commercial Serbian airline traffic had been. Two dayslater, Akashi told Annan that the investigation was deadlocked: he had discussed the affair with the833 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 124. Akashi to Annan, Z-284, 17/02/95 and FC, File #88040,SRSG Meetings, Senior StaffMeeting, 13/02/95. Cf. Harald Doornbos, ‘Groene spionnen tussen blauwhelmen’ (‘Green spies between blue helmets’), DeStem, 10/05/95.834 Confidential collection (12), ‘Reports of Possible Fixed Wing Flight Activity at Tuzla 10/12 Feb 95’, 18/02/95.835 Confidential interview (1).836 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 124, Akashi to Annan, Z-284, 17/02/95.837 MoD, CRST. Annan to Akashi, 566, 22/02/95 and O’shea, Crisis at Bihac, p. 158.