C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

232telephone cables should not run next to each other. 1231 There had been many past cases when atelephone receiver ‘on the hook’ had been used to monitor conversations in rooms.The UN’s ‘secure fax’ also had to be regarded as completely insecure and ‘compromised’because the UN had lent such a fax machine to the VRS for a while in order to enable communicationwith Pale from Sarajevo and Zagreb. The experts of the VRS and the VJ are sure to have taken all stepsto study this ‘secure communications resource’ in detail. Moreover, the communications centreregularly made mistakes, such as sending Coded Cables via non-secure fax machines.1232 In January1995 there was not even a secure communications link by fax or telephone between NATO SouthernCommand Headquarters (CINCSOUTH) and UNPF in Zagreb. In fact it was intentional UN policynot to use secure links; this was permitted only at the very highest level. 1233 The former UNPROFORcommander, Rose, claims in his memoirs that his former headquarters in Sarajevo was monitored byUS services in 1994-1995. The monitored conversations are said to have been sent directly to the USmilitary leadership in Naples. He also claimed that his communications traffic with the UNheadquarters in New York was intercepted by the NSA. According to Rose the Americans did thisbecause they feared he was too sympathetic towards the Bosnian Serbs.1234 Rose did not reveal howhe was monitored. It would indeed not be surprising if Rose was monitored, because the Americans didnot automatically have access to all the general’s correspondence. Rose was probably also monitored bythe Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs. 1235 In an interview Rose also claimed that the Bosnian secretservice eavesdropped on him. 1236Milos Stankovic’s book also revealed that the communications links of the highestUNPROFOR commanders were a major target for the US intelligence services. Stankovic worked asinterpreter and translator for Rose and later Smith. The Americans provided secure encrypted linksbetween Sarajevo and NATO for General Smith. These conversations normally took place via a securelink, known as the Tactical Satellite Radio (TacSat). This link consisted of two components: a receivercomponent and a transmitter component. During the time of Rose, and later under Smith, thissuddenly became three components. One day a member of General Smith’s staff discovered what thethird component was for. Smith had just carried out a number of conversations on this TacSat withWashington and London. Then Smith, accompanied by an aide, hurried to the neighbouring USembassy for a meeting. This member of Smith’s staff took a look around the embassy building whilethe general was in the meeting, and suddenly heard Smith’s voice coming from a room. It transpiredthat an American official was making a report of the telephone conversations that Smith had conductedhalf an hour earlier. Smith’s staff then knew for sure: the third component of the TacSat was an extratransmitter, which passed on all calls directly to a receiver at the US embassy. 1237 After this Smith, to thefury of the Americans, started using a special TacSat of the British SAS for his communications. Thisworked with the help of an encrypted link, which was difficult to intercept and to break. The NSA ishowever reported to have managed to do this. It all points to a deep-rooted American distrust ofBritish foreign policy. 1238The Americans monitored not only Smith and Rose, but probably the entire UNPROFORheadquarters in Sarajevo. Special ‘sweepteams’ sometimes came from the UK to Sarajevo to sweep thebuilding clean. But each time new eavesdropping microphones were found, which could however also1231 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 220, File RRFOS/2300-3 Opsec. Memorandum RRFOS, 25/07/95 and 08/09/95.1232 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 211, BHC Communications to HQ Zagreb, Security Violation, T-040, 30/11/94.1233 Confidential collection (7), Annan to Akashi, MSC-337, 27/01/95 and G 6 to COS Log, no. G6/94/031, 15/08/94.1234 Rose, Fighting, pp. 72-73; Andrew Gilligan, ‘American Satellite Spied on Britain’, Daily Telegraph, 01/09/96 andIntelligence Newsletter, no. 347, 26/11/98.1235 Confidential interview (13).1236 Marijnissen & Glastra van Loon, De Laatste Oorlog, pp. 108-109.1237 Stankovic, Trusted Mole, pp. 251-252 and confidential interview (80).1238 Ed Vulliamy, ‘How the CIA intercepted SAS signals’, The Guardian, 29/01/96 and ‘CIA luisterde VN-commandantgeneraal Rose in Sarajevo af’ (CIA eavesdropped on UN commander General Rose in Sarajevo), De Volkskrant, 30/01/96.