C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

196Advantages of SigintDue to the specific nature of the information obtained, Sigint has a number of special qualities makingit a highly effective method for gathering intelligence. Indeed, Sigint proved to be one, if not the, mostimportant source of intelligence during and after the Cold War. In October 1998 John Millis, the lateStaff Director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said that Sigint ‘has been andcontinues to be the intelligence of choice of the policymaker and the military commander’. He added:‘the fact of the matter is, it’s there quickly when needed. It’s always there. Or it has always beenthere.’ 1040 Nine advantages are listed below. One major advantage of this form of intelligence is that it isa passive method, generally conducted without the target knowing about it. Moreover, Sigint can beused against a target that is sometimes hundreds or even thousands of kilometres away. It is often notnecessary to position the intercepting equipment close to the target. Sigint thus has few political orphysical risks; an exception is formed by the gathering of this information by aircraft flying along thecoasts of various states.Secondly, Sigint is objective; it has a high reliability and that can sometimes even result in aperfect intelligence product. Sigint will, in contrast to intelligence gained from Humint, always be freeof political prejudice and will be not be influenced by the political perception of the agent’s sources.Humint can sometimes be politically coloured because it is supplied by traitors, or for reasons ofblackmail, corruption, or political or financial gain. But Sigint provides, in a raw state, exactly what hasbeen recorded in an unembellished, uninfluenced and undistorted form. Sigint has thus acquired animportant status with the recipients of intelligence. As a former CIA agent put it: ‘You know the originand you know that this is genuine. It’s not like a clandestine (Human Intelligence) report where youdon’t know if this is a good agent or a weak agent or a bad agent or a double agent.’ Another CIAofficer immediately pointed out the down-side too: ‘Electronic intercepts are great, but you don’t know1041if you’ve got two idiots talking on the phone.’A third advantage is that some – certainly not all – intercepts can be an autonomous intelligenceproduct, without the information needing to be verified through other sources. The former director ofthe CIA, Stansfield Turner, wrote in 1991:‘Electronic intercepts may be even more useful [than agents] in discerningintentions. For instance, if a foreign official writes about plans in a message andthe United States intercepts it, or if he discusses it and we record it with alistening device, those verbatim intercepts are likely to be more reliable thansecond-hand reports from an agent’. 1042An intercept can thus supply unique intelligence. This is why every morning the American president ispresented with not only a Top Secret Intelligence Summary but also a ‘Black Book’ with the mostimportant intercepts of the past 24 hours. In The Hague the highest government policymakers areprovided with a similar publication focussing on the Netherlands, known as the Groene Editie (GreenEdition). 1043Fourthly, Sigint is usually the form of intelligence most rapidly available to the intelligencerecipient. The NSA in particular can, thanks to its global eavesdropping network, supply Sigint fasterthan any other form of intelligence. During the 1962 Cuba Crisis, for instance, on average more than aweek was needed before a Humint report reached the CIA. Intercepts were directly available to the1040 ‘Address at the CIRA Luncheon, 5 October 1998; John Millis’ Speech’, in: CIRA Newsletter, Vol. XXIII (1998/1999), 4,p. 4.1041 Matthew Aid & Cees Wiebes, ‘Introduction on the importance of SIGINT in the Cold War’, in: Aid & Wiebes (eds.),Secrets, p. 6. See also: Bob Drogin, ‘At CIA School, Data Outweigh Derring-do’, Los Angeles Times, 27/08/00.1042 Stansfield Turner, ‘Intelligence for a New World Order’, Foreign Affairs, Fall 1991, p. 158.1043 De Graaff & Wiebes, Villa Maarheeze, pp. 280-282. In the UK this is known as the Blue Book. See: Urban, UK EyesAlpha, p. 8.