C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

352The Central Organization and the attack on the enclaveWhat elements of the intelligence gathered by the MIS actually reached the policymakers? In theDefence Crisis Management Centre (DCBC) the question as to the true intentions of the Bosnian Serbsconsistently remained unanswered. Did they want the entire enclave or just the southern road? Duringa hearing in Dutch Parliament a senior Defence official, J. de Winter, declared that ‘only later’ did herealize that the aims of the Bosnian Serbs went further. ‘That became clear, at least as far as I amconcerned, three or four days before the fall’. As explanation for this De Winter cites the fact that theVRS then started to attack OPs at the western and northern edges of the enclave. ‘That would bestrange if they aimed only to occupy the south-eastern tip’. De Winter thus concluded on 6 or 7 Julythat there was something strange going on, but declared that his further inquiries resulted in nothingapart from the statement that the only Serb goal was the southern road. 1986General Couzy was on holiday but was in constant contact with the Ministry of Defence. TheDeputy Commander in Chief of the Royal Netherlands Army, Major General A.P.M. van Baal, alsoappears to have had no prior knowledge, and was also unaware that warnings had been received. Hewas completely in the dark. 1987 The same was stated by Lieutenant Colonel M.C.J. Felix, Head ofOperational Affairs of the Royal Netherlands Army. No signals regarding the coming danger had beenreceived from foreign military attachés in The Hague either. Regarding the Dutch intelligence situationFelix said: ‘The Netherlands is a small country. In the intelligence community you’re at the bottom ofthe pile if you yourself have nothing to offer. In my view, this played a role during that period aswell.’ 1988 However, the Dutch with their excellent F-16s had TACRECCE to offer.It is also important that in the decisive weeks before the fall of Srebrenica, the MIS/CO and theMIS/Army were not present at the DCBC for crisis consultations. Their presence was in fact notcustomary and was obviously not considered necessary during this time of tension.1989 MinisterVoorhoeve confirmed to Parliament that no prior knowledge was held. The MIS appeared not to havehad any. Voorhoeve admitted that The Hague remained in great uncertainty right up to the end and didnot have its own independent intelligence. 1990 Couzy also admits in his memoirs that he had no priorknowledge. He thought that the operation was aimed at the southern road, and it was only on Thursdayevening, 10 July, that Couzy realized that the VRS were out to take the entire enclave. 1991In short: ‘The Hague’ was surprised at the sudden attack. Is it true that, apart from a fewunclear indications from the DIS, no other foreign intelligence and security services were aware of thesituation? It is almost inconceivable that with all their Sigint and Imint, the US services should havegathered no information. Moreover, the Bosnian intelligence and security services also had good Sigint.Was this not shared with UNPROFOR or the United States?7. The foreign intelligence servicesIn Section 3 it was established that the plans for a VRS attack on the enclave were made only at a verylate stage and in a short time. There were no preparations beginning months earlier. The preparationsfor the attack on Srebrenica took place between 2 and 6 July. The goal of the operation was, as said, notto conquer the Safe Area but to reduce it in size and to cut the link with Zepa. Prior knowledge aboutthe occupation of the entire enclave could thus only have been available after 9 July, because this waswhen the decision was taken. The question as to whether prior knowledge existed must thus focus on a1986 TCBU, Vertrekpunt The Hague, Part 1, pp. 182-183.1987 Hearing of Bakker Commission, Stenographic report of testimony by A. Van Baal, X19/14-06-2000, No. 121U.doc-3,31/05/00.1988 Interviews with M.J.C. Felix, 06/04/00 and A.M. van der Togt, 04/05/00.1989 Confidential interview (26).1990 TCBU, Vertrekpunt The Hague, Part 1, p. 182.1991 Couzy, Mijn Jaren, pp. 155-163.