C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

228by Milosevic to get rid of Karadzic through a coup d’etat by Mladic in the Republika Srpska, as LordOwen recalled. 1211The analysis by the NSA of this high-level military traffic gave US policymakers and analystsfrom the intelligence community important information about the VRS activities in Bosnia. Themessages from Mladic’s headquarters in Han Pijesak were intensively monitored, which led toconsiderable insights into the military activities and capabilities. The regularly interceptedcommunications also told the analysts, however, a great deal about Mladic’s personality and changingmoods. The GCHQ was also reportedly able, via the British Army Intelligence Corps in Gornji Vakuf,to monitor the communications to and from Mladic. Various sources confirm that GCHQ and theBritish Sigint units in the region had successfully intercepted this military communications traffic. Laterin the war these intercepts gave ‘a dramatic insight into the general’s depression, paranoia and growingmental instability’. 1212Did Sigint provide prior knowledge of the aims of the VRS regarding Srebrenica?Up to now it is not clear whether, through Sigint, Western intelligence services knew of VRS plans toconquer Srebrenica. The issue of prior knowledge of the attack is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 8.There have been many press publications about Comint relating to the Srebrenica attack. In July 1995the NSA, the Bundesnachrichtendienst, the French and also the Austrian Military Intelligence Services arereported to have intercepted military radio traffic which, it is said, proved conclusively that the VRSplanned to attack Gorazde, Zepa and Srebrenica. This intelligence supposedly showed that theoffensive was supported in deep secrecy by Belgrade.However, a CIA employee with access to high-level Comint dismissed these reports as false. Henoted that much tactical military information about the reinforcement of the VRS around Srebrenicawas available, but according to him the aims of the VRS were totally overlooked by analysts of the USintelligence community due to insufficient analysis capacity. 1213 Staff of the GCHQ and the UKDefence Intelligence Staff, also discovered that Comint only seldom produced reports containing awarning of impending military offensives by the VRS. An employee of the former organization told thejournalist Urban: ‘A lot of communication is done by [secure] land line or face-to-face. Mladic likes tobe there in person during a big operation.’ 1214 Indeed, this proved highly relevant to the events inSrebrenica.The first press articles claiming that the American intercepted messages indicating a plannedVRS attack on Srebrenica date from August and November 1995. According to articles in theinternational media, three weeks before the attack on Srebrenica and for the period of a full week theNSA intercepted a large number of messages between Mladic and the Serbian general Perisic inBelgrade. These intercepts related to the planning of the offensive, which was then in full swing. Thenumber of required troops and suitable dates for the VRS offensive are said to have been discussed. Awestern intelligence officer claimed that ‘Mladic and Perisic conferred constantly about their strategyand what they were doing’. According to him it was also the case that ‘Mladic is always asking Perisic1215about what he should be doing’. It should be noted here that a great deal of preparatory planningwas not required for the taking of Srebrenica. Mladic could probably do what he needed to on his own.Mladic probably did not need Perisic for the actual attack, apart from logistic support, and this wasalready constantly available. These considerations do not however rule out the possibility that they hadcontacts.1211 Interview with Lord Owen, 27/06/01.1212 Urban, UK Eyes, pp. 216-217 and Karsten Prager, ‘Message from Serbia’, Time, 17/07/95.1213 Confidential interviews (12), (13) and (54).1214 Urban, UK Eyes, pp. 216-217.1215 Cabell Bruce, ‘Belgrade Blamed’, Newsday, 12/08/95 and Roy Gutman, ‘Federal Army Tied to Bosnia Crimes’, Newsday,01/11/95.