C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

332‘We knew what was going to happen in Srebrenica. Mladic was going to bemore merciless than ever to get revenge for his setbacks. Only a fool couldn’thave seen it coming, or someone very badly informed. I don’t know whetherGeneral Janvier is a fool or very badly informed, but he is an accessory to thisgenocide’. 1848The question is whether Mendiluce had this knowledge at the time or whether he first arrived at thisviewpoint after the event; the latter seems more likely.Prior knowledge held by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)MSF was the only organization that heard the rumours that the VRS was busy preparing an attack. Thisis revealed by an MSF report of 27 June 1995. Important sources ‘close to the VRS said that the VRSmight soon launch a large-scale offensive on Srebrenica with the intention of taking the entireenclave’. 1849 This report came one day after the ABiH attack on Visnjica. 1850 It was probably not passedon to Dutchbat or Zagreb UNPROFOR HQ. Since the actual order was first issued on 2 July, onemight ask whether this MSF information was of a tactical or strategic nature. It is also unclear who thesource in the VRS was.Prior knowledge held by the ABiHThe ABiH claimed to have had prior knowledge. The commander of the 2nd Corps in Tuzla, GeneralSead Delic, claimed afterwards in an interview that the attack did not come as a surprise. The 2ndCorps, said Delic, had corresponding intelligence and warned Karremans, but he did not believe this. 1851It is strange, however, that no traces of this have been found in the Dutchbat reports. It is also strangethat the reports of the 2nd Corps to the ABiH headquarters in Sarajevo also make no mention of thisfact. On 3 July the Corps reported exclusively on the humanitarian situation in Srebrenica. There wasan almost catastrophic shortage of food and the ABiH troops could not operate properly withoutenough food. 1852 Moreover, the 8-page post-mortem analysis drawn up by the 2nd Corps for the ABiHheadquarters in Sarajevo does not indicate any prior knowledge. 1853The ABiH also sent reports to UNPROFOR, but there too, according to Delic, nothing wasdone about the Bosnian warnings. 1854 As described in Chapter 6, Sigint played an important role for theABiH and reportedly provided important information. The most important monitoring stations were inTuzla, Okresanica and Konjuh, operated by the Electronic Warfare unit of the 2nd Corps and theSigint section of the Bosnian national security service. This latter section worked independently of theElectronic Warfare unit, but shared intelligence with it. The goal of these stations was to monitor andrecord the military radio traffic of the VRS. This was also carried out before, during and after the fall ofSrebrenica, according to various testimonies for the Tribunal during the trial of General Krstic. Konjuhfocussed chiefly on the Drina Corps and the general staff of the VRS. 18551848 AICG call to indict General Janvier’, Bosnia Report, No. 1, November-December 1997, p. 4.1849 Archives MSF, Brussels. MSF Capsats, Message IN 481, 27/06/95.1850 MoD, DCBC, Box 66. Captain RNLAF P.C.J. Blonk, ‘Chronologisch overzicht Srebrenica 1 maart 1996 t/m 26 juli 1996, Stg.Geheim’ (Chronological overview of Srebrenica 1 March 1996 to 26 July 1996, Strictly Confidential), 11/07/96.1851 Interview with Sead Delic, 10/03/99.1852 ABiH, Tuzla. Archive 13-05-95, Report from 2nd Corps to HQ, no. 02-2-13-489, 03/07/95 and Report from 2nd Corpsto HQ, unnumbered, 04/07/95.1853 ABiH, Tuzla, Archive 13-05-95, Report from 2nd Corps to HQ, Report of the events in Srebrenica for the General Staffof the ABiH in Sarajevo, Document No. 24, Draft Top Secret (8 pp.), 28/08/95.1854 Interview with Sead Delic, 09/03/99.1855 Overview of Court Proceedings, statements by 8 witnesses, 30/06/00 and 23/06/00, on:http:/www.un.org/icty/news/Krstic/Krstic-cp.htm