C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

31The first step taken by the Bush administration to put this new policy into effect was the ‘launch’ ofNational Security Directive 74, which set down guidelines for more generous intelligence sharingduring peacekeeping operations. 115 The Americans established a separate structure for the necessaryliaison, and also built in levels for the classification of documents that could be handed over to the UN.The Director of the CIA, Robert Gates, designated the Defense Intelligence Agency as the mostimportant channel for the intelligence support to the UN by the United States in peacekeepingoperations. This support was not to be permanent but subject to review on a case-by-case basis. Thefirst UN mission to benefit was the UNTAC operation in Cambodia. 116President Clinton inherited this policy from his predecessor, and produced Presidential ReviewDirective (PRD) 13, in which he expressed support for the more extensive participation of Americanarmed forces in peace operations. Domestic political considerations tripped up this apparent success,however, because the directive met with resistance in Congress and was then withdrawn. 117 This againshowed the popularity of UN-bashing in Congress.Congress felt vindicated by the dramatic events of October 1993, when 18 US Rangers were118killed and 78 wounded at Mogadishu in Somalia. This even led to a small rebellion in Congress.James Woolsey, former Director of the CIA, confirmed that matters had indeed gone wrong in Somaliaand there were suspicions that American intelligence had been leaked via the UN, enabling the warlordMohammed Farah Aideed to strike. The sharing of intelligence between the Americans and the Italianshad also been known to go wrong. In the absence of a clear policy underlying the sharing ofintelligence, decisions were made on the spot. ‘It was a verbal decision with no paper moving around’,according to Woolsey. In his opinion, a local Chief of Station (COS) could only share intelligence if heor she was duly authorized.However, there was no clear policy on this point.119 It would appear that policy was mostlydecided in the field, certainly where tactical intelligence was involved. Woolsey suspected that sharingwith UNPROFOR was at a low level, going no further than confidential status. He commented that, inthe case of a normal peacekeeping operation, there would not actually be very much need forintelligence, but in the case of a war there obviously would. Therefore, according to him, a CIA liaisonofficer was posted to Zagreb and Sarajevo at UNPROFOR headquarters. 120 However, a senior USintelligence official remarked that the situation described by Woolsey was Somalia in the early 1990’s,not the Balkans in mid-1995. By 1995, there was a clear written US policy, thoroughly understood atmultiple levels, on the thresholds of information release from US channels into the UN. According tothis official, this new policy was aggressively pursued by the most senior leadership. 121In any case, the intelligence leaks in Somalia led American Congress one month later to draw upthe International Peacekeeping Policy Act of 1993, which among other things proposed curtailingintelligence sharing with the UN. An amendment to the Peace Powers Act of 1994 was also submittedwith the same objective in January 1994. It is true that both proposals were never raised for discussion,but the tone in Congress had been set. President Clinton took no notice of this, and in May 1994 heissued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which was a revision of his earlier PRD 13. PDD 25also went against the wishes of Congress by providing for an expansion of intelligence support to theUN. 122115 George Bush Library, FOIA, National Security Directive 74, Peacekeeping and Emergency Humanitarian Relief Policy, 24/11/92.116 Robert J. Allen, ‘Intelligence Support for Peace Operations’, in: Pickert, Intelligence, p. 117.117 See for the text of PRD-13: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pddd13.htm.118 For this, see also: John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Peacekeeping and U.S. interests’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17 (1994) 4, p.175.119 See for the personal recollections of the COS in Mogadishu: Garrett Jones, ‘Working with the CIA’, Parameters, Winter2001/2002, pp. 28-39.120 Interview with R.J. Woolsey, 08/06/00. For this, see also Chapter 3.121 Confidential information (80).122 For a description of the content of PDD-25: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pddd13.htm.