C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

341The UN headquarters in New YorkThe headquarters of the UN did not have its own intelligence channels. As described earlier, theheadquarters had a ‘situation centre’, which included a special cell with representatives of theintelligence services of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Intelligence was providedto the Secretary-General, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and specially selectedofficials. Within the DPKO, not everyone at the highest level received intelligence from all services.Some received intelligence from the Russian foreign intelligence service but not from Western services.The CIA sometimes supplied Imint and the British mostly Humint. But this special cell too received nointelligence about Srebrenica. 1914 The report of the informal consultation with the members of theSecurity Council held on 3 July 1995 indicates that no major military operation was expected. Theeastern enclaves were not even mentioned. 1915 The Canadian General M. Baril, the Canadian Chief ofDefence Staff and former Senior Military Adviser to the Secretary-General of the UN, had noforewarning either. However, it did not surprise him that Srebrenica fell. Very laconically he remarked:‘If deterrence works, it works, if not, not.’ 1916In other words, senior policymakers and the UN headquarters in New York had no relevantintelligence. Akashi declared that he did not have intelligence and had no knowledge of the BosnianSerb plans. ‘If any government had such reports, they were not shared with the UN.’ Akashi did notknow whether Mladic aimed for the fall of the enclave right from the start. Perhaps the VRS generalwas an opportunist who, when he realized that no resistance was being offered, pressed on. ‘NATOmay have had intelligence’, but Akashi did not wish to comment on press reports to this effect. He hadearlier asked for intelligence reports on Rwanda and Zaire, and then received documents of foreignorigin on an non-attributable basis. He had never received anything about Srebrenica. 1917It should ne noted that Akashi, of course, was speaking figuratively rather than literally. Forexample, during the month of June alone, Srebrenica was reported on in the Zagreb DefenseInformation Summary on 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 25, 26, 28, 29. Akashi and his staffwere the primary consumer of this report, along with the Force Commander and his staff. Of these 18reports on Srebrenica, none predicted the imminent collapse of the enclave. Presumably Akashi wasreferring to any predictive intelligence which spoke unequivocally of the collapse of the Srebrenicaenclave. The deputy G-2 Morgan personally briefed Mr. Akashi on 29 June, covering the overall theatresituation. His intelligence brief covered the following strategic issues: Croatia: 1) polarization of factionsover Krajina; 2) Sector east update. Bosnia: 1) Summer long VRS campaign expected to focus onnorth-south lines of communication as well as stabilizing the Posavina Corridor. 2) emerging tacticalconfidence on part of the ABiH. 3) Parallels between factions in BiH and VRS. However, no predictiveintelligence of an attack on the Srebrenica enclave (or any enclaves) was broached, but anticipation of asummer-long VRS offensive was discussed. Not only was this anticipated for some time, and it was theusual pattern for summertime warfare in Bosnia and Croatia. Additionally, VRS strategists recognizedthat without substantial gains in the summer of 1995, any negotiated settlement would be that muchmore disadvantageous to the Serbs. However, a major problem with Akashi was also that he was notvery often available. The US Deputy G-2 personally tried to brief Akashi as often as possible wheneverhis schedule would permit, which was not terribly often. Akashi did receive genuine all-source briefingsduring the tenure of the US intelligence official in Zagreb. 1918At the time Annan had put critical questions to Akashi about the ignorance of Zagreb and whatwas ‘provided to UNPROFOR by those troop-contributing nations with intelligence-gathering assets inthe area’? He had also stated: ‘I find it difficult to accept that no “early warning” was possible when the1914 Confidential interview (58).1915 UNNY, DPKO. Coded cables. Annan to Akashi, No. MSC 2182, 03/07/95.1916 Interview with Maurice Baril, 21/12/99.1917 Interview with Y. Akashi, 29/11/99.1918 Confidential information (80).