C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

343Who did have prior knowledge? In 4 July 1995 in Belgrade, Vladimir Matovic, the formeradviser to President Cosic, heard from his foreign ‘political friends’ that something was going on nearSrebrenica. He did not wish to reveal who these friends were. He called political sympathizers in Pale,but they knew nothing. On 7 July local newspapers wrote that the VRS was going on the offensive.Matovic knew nothing. ‘His friends’ had told him on 4 July that an attack was imminent, but advisorsof Karadzic and Mladic in Pale said (after Matovic contacted them) this was not the case. Who shouldbe believed? He later realized that people outside Mladic’s circle did indeed know nothing. 1927 IfMatovic’s claims are true, then the VRS army command was the only group to be aware of what wascoming. This can also be deduced from a conversation with Dragan Milovanovic, who at that time hadalready been a war photographer for eight years. A woman had told him that two days before the attackwomen in Bratunac noticed that something was about to happen. Mladic had told local militarypersonnel that they should reveal nothing of what they were doing, not even to their mothers andwives. Milovanovic found this striking, because other Serb attacks had generally been discussed longand openly beforehand. 1928In Belgrade, however, politicians responded to the events with incredulity. The Canadiandiplomat Dennis Snider, who worked at the Canadian embassy, experienced this for himself. Accordingto him the mood in Belgrade was one of disbelief. The hunting of the column of men on the route toTuzla was understandable, but not the later executions. Most of the people he talked to found this hardto accept. General Momcilo Perisic 1929 of the VJ apparently did know of the attack. He told theCanadian diplomat that he knew of a ‘significant force to Srebrenica’. Officers of the VJ were stationedat the headquarters in Han Pijesak and regular officers of the VJ constantly accompanied Mladic. 1930The question is whether he had informed Milosevic of this. An interview with Rajko Dukic, who talkedto Milosevic after the fall of the enclave, indicates that the president was indeed surprised. Thepresident had asked the group of persons that included Dukic ‘which idiot’ had taken the decision toattack Srebrenica. According to the president the enclave would have bled dry or have becomedepopulated anyway. Milosevic then drew a comparison with letting water flow away over a plank ofwood. According to Dukic the struggle for prestige between Mladic and Karadzic also played a role.Mladic needed a success. 19316. Did The Hague have prior knowledge?According to staff of the MIS, they never received hard intelligence from sister services which warnedof an attack. One of the sources from which intelligence might have been obtained was NATO.Reports were sent daily from the Deployed Shed Facility (DSF) in Naples. The DSF was an intelligencecell operated by several member states (including the Netherlands). It should be stated again: NATOhas no intelligence capabilities of its own apart from AWACS, and is totally dependent on theintelligence supplied by the member states. If a tactical warning had been available then it would havebeen very likely to have arrived through NATO channels. An analysis of the reports, which the NIODwas able to access gives the picture described below.The Balkan Intelligence Summary by the purely US Joint Analysis Center (JAC) in Molesworthon 6 June, i.e. shortly before Karremans’ ‘alarm warning’, predicted for the next 24 to 96 hours that theVRS might possibly increase its military activities on the line of confrontation in Bihac, but notelsewhere. Such a development was not expected in SNE. Only certain OPs would come under heavier1927 Interview with Vladimir Matovic, 16/12/00.1928 Interview with Dragan Milovanovic, 17/12/99.1929 Persisic was later accused for working for the CIA. ‘Court Postpones Spy Trial of Former Yugo Army Chief’, Reuters,24/12/02.1930 Interview with Dennis Snider, 17/11/99.1931 Interview with Rajko Dukic, 14/06/00.