C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

17The second phase in the intelligence cycle is the gathering of raw data. 40 This can happen in anumber of ways: firstly via open sources, such as newspapers, magazines, books, government studiesand radio and television broadcasts. This has also been referred to for a number of years as OpenSource Intelligence (‘Osint’). It is concerned with everything that appears in printed form or isbroadcast on radio or television. Thanks in part to the Internet, most services currently draw a largeamount of their information from open sources. It is estimated that (and it is only a guess) that underideal circumstances, open source information will comprise somewhere around 10%-15% of theintelligence input into an all-source analysis. It is therefore incorrect to equate intelligence with‘espionage’, although this mistake is commonly made. Espionage actually refers exclusively to variousclandestine ways of gathering information. An example of such a furtive method would be the use oftechnical resources like film, photography or electronic intercept traffic, typically carried out fromstations on land, special ships, aircraft or satellites. We will later deal more extensively with these specialforms of intelligence, which include Signals Intelligence (‘sigint’), Communications Intelligence(‘Comint’), Radar Intelligence (‘Radint’) and Imagery Intelligence (‘Imint’).A second method of gathering intelligence is from human sources, which is known as HumanIntelligence (‘Humint’). Humint involves intelligence gathering through person-to-person contacts,including through a party’s own agents, reports from attachés, other diplomatic reporting and thesystematic debriefing of Displaced Persons, emigrants, deserters, captured soldiers, released hostages,and so on. The clandestine part of Humint is concerned in general with the use of case officers oragents, who furnish information that is unobtainable in any other way from open sources. Here, case41officers are employees of national intelligence services, and agents are mostly of foreign origin.Humint is particularly important in peacekeeping operations. Both the local population and seniorsoldiers or politicians may deliver valuable intelligence. Displaced Persons from a Safe Area can oftenalso come up with important information in systematic debriefings, as can the non-governmentalorganizations that operate in certain areas.The third and most important step in the cycle is the processing of all received data, from bothopen and secret sources. The large intelligence services, for example, deal with enormous quantities ofintercepted message traffic that has to be decoded or translated. It is also necessary to process data inthe first instance using advanced computers. Moreover, photographs, films and other recordings haveto be developed before they can be studied and investigated further. Furthermore, Humint reports haveto be analysed in more detail and verified against intelligence obtained from Sigint and Imint. In abattalion, this is mainly done by a section known as S-2 and, at UNPROFOR level, G-2. The othersections are dealt with more comprehensively in the main report, whereas this study focuses on theintelligence activities usually designated as such in military organizations.A low intensity conflict demands that intelligence is appraised differently from intelligencegathered in a war situation, which is what army training focuses on. In a normal war, for example, fourtanks on a road would be assessed in the traditional way as ‘reinforcement or reconnaissance’, whereasin Bosnia it often heralded a large-scale offensive.On receipt of data, the intelligence would without doubt have been analysed in further detail atsector level (such as Sector North East of UNPROFOR, which included Srebrenica). In thisconnection, the information provided by the United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) would haveplayed an important role. This was a two-way process: intelligence would have flowed from the higherechelons of Bosnia-Hercegovina Command in Sarajevo (later known as UNPROFOR) and theUNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb (later known as UNPF) to Sector North East and to Dutchbat,and vice versa.40 De Valk points out that the Netherlands National Security Service (BVD) used the word ‘gathering’ and not collecting.De Valk, De BVD en Inlichtingenrapportages, p. 25.41 Godson, May & Schmitt, U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads, p. 4. There is also the third, somewhat vaguer, category known as‘grey sources’. These are people or companies who, intentionally or unintentionally, disclose sensitive information in thecourse of conversations.