C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

115In reality the MIS/Army functioned as an intelligence organization for the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Tactical intelligence was gathered, geared towards the deployment of units. TheMIS/Army constantly assessed the intelligence to see whether it was relevant for passing on to theMIS/CO. The CDS rather fell outside MIS lines: he may have been an adviser to the Minister, but sowas each individual Commander-in-Chief and they saw themselves as occupying an independentposition relative to the Minister. Every Commander-in-Chief wanted an autonomous and independentintelligence position, and felt no actual need for integration. 533Defence Minister Voorhoeve answered the question of whether he was aware of the conflictsand differences between the MIS/CO and the MIS/Army as follows: ‘No. I did not know, and so itwas covered up’. Voorhoeve went on to provide an explanation for this phenomenon: ‘this is a normalresponse within an organization, I would say, because people never want to reveal to the upperechelons that differences of opinion exist. Generally speaking the information you are given is boringlyuniform. People report what they have been able to agree on and leave out what they could not agreeon.’ 534Ultimately, a last-ditch attempt was made to improve the collaboration between the MIS/COand the three MISs. This happened in early 1995 in the form of the Yugoslavia project organization. 535The Deputy Head of MIS/Army functioned as chairman; the coordinator was the Head of theMIS/Army’s Production Section, and the MIS/Army, MIS/Navy, MIS/Air Force and MIS/CO couldeach supply a representative. The aim of this was to ensure the compilation or formulation of thecomplete intelligence and/or counterintelligence requirements for the area of the former Yugoslavia;the gathering and, where necessary, sharing of all relevant information with respect to the area;dissemination of overviews with key questions and/or ad hoc questions; the periodic distribution of alist of the existing forms of reporting, and coordination of efforts related to the recruitment or liaisonprocess. 536The purpose of this project team’s meetings was to improve the structure of the intelligence onYugoslavia and to prevent duplication. 537 This remained an aspiration, however, partly because of theattitude of various department heads. An example of this is the meeting of 30 June 1995, at which,according to the agenda and the minutes, the state of affairs in Srebrenica was not covered. Theminutes did state that it had been agreed to carry out a survey within the Ministry of Defence into theSerbo-Croat capacity there. The next meeting would not take place until 4 August. 538Ultimately, in spite of the limited resources and all the mutual differences and conflicts,impressive quantities of reports were delivered by the MIS/CO and MIS/Army analysts; the contact onthe shop floor was, as already mentioned, good. These reports mainly took the form of IntelligenceSummaries, which could be divided into the categories daily and weekly. The daily messages attemptedto provide an insight into the current developments and also presented forecasts. The weekly editionpresented an outline of the events of the past week and the outlook for the coming week. Monthlysummaries, annual summaries and Intelligence Reports (Intreps) were also produced, including theincidental sup(plementary) intreps. 539In addition, the MIS analysts produced threat analyses (assessments), order of battle basicdocuments, country studies, studies on tactics and the operations of the warring factions. 540 Forinstance, a comprehensive threat analysis of the situation in Mostar and a counterintelligence533 Confidential interview (27).534 Interview with J. Voorhoeve, 01/10/01.535 MoD , Archive MIS/CO, Letter Bokhoven to Management meeting, Desirability and possibility of instituting a project organization for Intelligence on the former Yugoslavia, No. 27265,12/01/95.536 MoD, Archive MIS/Air Force , CAS 49, Dutchbat reports, Draft decision on instituting a project organization for the former Yugoslavia, approx. March 1995.537 Confidential interview (28).538 MoD , Archive MIS/CO, DIS/9512134/1709, Minutes of meeting and agendas, No. 32764/140795, 14/07/95.539 See for example: MoD . Archive MIS/Army Management Operations, Supintrep Zepa and Srebrenica, No. 28401/4/080394, 15/03/94 and Intrep Srebrenica No. 32729/4/060795, 10/07/95.540 MoD , Archive MIS/Army, Operations Directorate, Memorandum on Intelligence products for Dutch deployment in the former Yugoslavia, No. 22279/1/061093, 04/10/93.