C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

117his benefit, and many others. It was initially released through the NATO Intelligence Center atAFSOUTH and later directly from JAC, Molesworth.The staff in Villafranca was constantly aware of possible espionage by the Bosnian Serbs.Highly secure links were used. The staff had crypto telephones and the crypto code on LOCE waschanged every day. This meant that little information leaked out. What did leak out, to Belgrade to beprecise, were the daily Air Task Messages (ATMs). 545 They were drawn up 12 hours in advance and theydescribed the mission and the targets. Too many people within NATO knew of this. At the same time,the VRS is said to have had a good source in NATO circles. 546 These efforts were not alwaysappreciated by senior MIS/Air Force officials. In spite of the enormous pressure of work, the Balkansunit received no additional personnel, for example, but were sometimes reproached for their analyses.However, analysts admitted that this never led to a direct intervention by the heads of the MIS/AirForce, nor to a demand that the text be amended.At shop floor level, the relationship between the MIS/Air Force and the MISs at the other twobranches of the Armed Forces was excellent, but personnel were reminded from above that distanceshould be maintained. This led to bizarre situations, such as an MIS/Army analyst furtively deliveringan envelope containing raw intelligence to the home of an MIS/Air Force analyst under cover ofdarkness, and depositing it in the letterbox. According to MIS/Air Force personnel, senior officials atthe other two MISs blocked more intensive collaboration, which was actually a bitter necessity. The factwas that in principle all of the MISs had largely the same intelligence on the table, but what reallymattered was the analysis. This could vary somewhat, because each MIS looked at the data throughdifferent eyes. The attack on the Krajina was given as an example. MIS/Air Force and MIS/Navydetermined: ‘es geht los’. The MIS/Army was of the opinion that nothing was going to happen. This wasthe position taken by their analyst at the daily briefing at the Defence Crisis Management Centre.Unfortunately for him, Operation Storm started the following day, in which the Croats attacked the547Bosnian Serbs in the Krajina.Intelligence support for the air operations was deemed to be of eminent importance to theNetherlands Air Force detachment in Villafranca. The demands on this were that the informationissued had to be of the highest possible quality, up-to-date and tailored to suit requirements. Theintelligence section in Villafranca made use of NATO reports generated, for example, by theintelligence cell of the Fifth Allied Air Force in Vicenza and the US Joint Analysis Center (JAC) inMolesworth.Secondly, consistent use was made of the messages from the Deny Flight IntelligenceSummaries, compiled by the MIS/Air Force in The Hague. According to the detachment commanderin Villafranca, Lieutenant Colonel J. Eikelboom the Deny Flight Intelligence Summary was of excellentquality. He spotted a problem with the intelligence generated by Vicenza and the Joint Analysis Center.They were completely dependent for their information on the American, British, German and Frenchservices, and what they were willing to release in the way of intelligence.In the case of Deny Flight especially, political interests played a significant role. The idea existedthat various intelligence services were only releasing those items that suited the political interests oftheir government. It often turned out to be the case that the intelligence passed on by them wasincomplete or even incorrect. This was regularly demonstrated to the compilers of the DFIS. Througha better use of other sources, the Deny Flight Intelligence staff later arrived at a much better andrealistic assessment, which resulted in an indispensable product. When the decision was taken todistribute the DFIS weekly instead of daily with effect from 15 September 1995 due to personnelproblems, Eikelboom protested. This was because the intelligence from the Combined Air OperationsCentre and JAC, Molesworth was of inferior quality. 548545 Confidential interview (32). The same probably happened during the Kosovo Crisis: Jon Henley, ‘Former major denies treason’, in The Guardian, 12/12/01.546 Interview with Milovan Milutinovic, 20-22/03/00.547 Confidential interview (31). For Operation Storm: Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force, pp. 177 - 194.548 MoD, Archive DOPKlu, J. Eikelboom to Operations Directorate Klu D. Berlin, No. VF/95/3066, 23/09/95 and attached memo from HAVI, 04/10/95.