C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

320‘lead me to think that his main effort will be in the east. In order to achieve a sufficient concentrationof force, he will probably have to neutralize one or all of the Eastern enclaves.’ His intelligence staffshared this opinion. 1767 One of Smith’s intelligence officers, the American Brian Powers, laterconcluded that Mladic would probably take over the enclaves in June. A source in the Serb general’sstaff is said to have confirmed this. 1768 An officer who analysed the intelligence for Smith later told RoyGutman: ‘We felt it would occur by June.’ 1769At the meeting with Akashi and Janvier in Split at the start of June 1995 1770 , Smith declared thathe was convinced that the VRS would continue to challenge the international community to show thatthe Serbs would not submit to control. In his opinion this could lead to an intensification of the siegeof Sarajevo, or in the long term an attack on the eastern enclaves. He said that UNPROFOR wouldhave great difficulty in finding a suitable response to this crisis, with the exception of air strikes. Smithreportedly stood alone with this sombre analysis; the French intelligence community attached littlecredit to this view. General Clark at the Pentagon did not believe either that an attack would takeplace. 1771 Early in the year the intelligence section in Sarajevo pointed out, with regard to the capabilitiesof the VRS for conducting offensive operations, that the VRS response to the ABiH offensives had notyet materialized. In previous cases this response had been relatively swift, with the use of heavyequipment and troops. Possible reasons cited for this phenomenon were: problems with logistics andsupplies, lack of infantry, dissatisfaction among the officers and NCOs about the course of the war,long preparation periods needed to carry out military operations, internal disputes within the politicalleadership in Pale and finally the possibility that the Bosnian Serbs had not closed all their doors on apeace agreement. Every major operation aimed at the enclaves would exclude the possibility of aninternational settlement. The VRS counteractions would thus not be aimed at the enclave, but at otherareas. The goal was thus to lure ABiH troops out of other areas and thereby to force the Muslims ontothe defensive. 1772In 1995 a discussion on the possible abandonment of the enclaves also began within the UN’sDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The fact that this option was discussed was typicalof the mood at that time. According to the Assistant Secretary-General for Planning and Support, theGerman General Manfred Eisele, the idea of letting the enclaves go originated with Smith and Janvier.The Security Council opposed this, however, because agreement to the proposal would be anadmission that the Safe Area concept devised by the Council had failed. Moreover, most of the SecurityCouncil members generally took their lead from the United States and the US felt that the easternenclaves should be maintained. 1773At the end of May tension in Bosnia increased. The NATO bombardments near Pale on 25 and26 May, following by the taking hostage of UN personnel, had a strong influence on the situation. TheBosnian Serbs not only took UN personnel hostage, but also threatened observations posts around theeastern enclaves. This happened around Gorazde and Zepa, but Dutchbat was to encounter problemstoo.The question is whether the threat to the enclaves increased at the start of June 1995, followingintensification of the hostage crisis when western countries announced their plans for troopreinforcements in the form of a Rapid Reaction Force. An analysis by the intelligence staff in Zagreb1767 Confidential collection (7), BHC Situation Report by General Smith, No. 8800 Confidential, 05/04/95, and BHC G-2Assessment, 05/04/95.1768 NIOD, Coll. Westerman. Interview Cable Bruce with Brian Powers, undated.1769 Roy Gutman, ‘UN’s Deadly Deal’, Newsday, 29/05/96.1770 NIOD, Coll. Banbury. SRSG’s Meeting in Split, 09/06/95; See also Chapter 1 of Part III.1771 Interview with James Baxter, 16/10/00.1772 Confidential collection (4). Memorandum VRS – Ability to conduct offensive operations from Capt. Wallace to COS, Zagreb,11/04/95.1773 Interview with Manfred Eisele, 14/10/99.