C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

54Sigint) area, so that some British services more or less ‘ran dry’. 222 There was in particular Americanconcern about General Rose’s alleged sympathy for the Serb cause and there were manifest politicaldifferences between the Clinton government and Whitehall about policy regards Bosnia. The animositymentioned between the US and the British was probably also partly caused by the secret trainingprogrammes that the Americans had given to the Muslims in the past, and later to the Croats. Furthermorethe Americans did not wish to disclose much to their NATO partners about the clandestine operationsthat the CIA and DIA carried out behind enemy lines in Serbia.During the US election campaign Bob Dole lashed out at the British, who were said to befrustrating many American operations, but this was denied on the British side. When Dole paid a visit toLondon, he was said to have been taken aside and shown a long list of covert operations that the CIA wasinvolved in at that moment in Yugoslavia. The British told Dole that if he were to carry out one more223political attack on London, the list would be made public. After that, Dole backed down.The British intelligence services became increasingly dependent on the United States. Forinstance, in 1993 approximately 95 per cent of the Sigint dealt with by the GCHQ was, according toUrban, of American origin. Also with respect to financing, monitoring posts and secure transatlanticcommunication links, the British were completely dependent on the NSA. 224 It should be noted,however, that a senior US intelligence official interviewed by the author rejected this 95 per cent andcame to a much lower figure. 225 The American-British intelligence relationship in later years improvedagain, especially after Tony Blair came to office.The above example shows that fundamental political and military differences of opinion caninfluence intelligence liaison. There was a disagreement between America and Britain on Bosnia. Theconstant US pressure to deploy air power, and Washington’s refusal to deploy ground forces particularlygalled London. This ultimately resulted in the partial reduction of American intelligence input to theBritish. Captain Cooke of the UK Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) had the following to say on thesubject:‘They more or less admitted they were holding stuff back from us, noteverything but really the bits relating to most pronounced political divide. Theydidn’t feel we took their information about Serb atrocities seriously enough (...)They pushed the stuff which favoured more punitive action against the BosnianSerbs’. 226Mistrust of an ally’s political intentions can strongly influence a liaison. An example of Americanmistrust was the fact that the CIA’s Directorate of Operations had a special cell of approximatelytwenty staff whose most important task was to analyse the British reports, in order to establish theidentities of agents that SIS (the British foreign intelligence service) had recruited in the formerYugoslavia, and what other sources the British services in Bosnia had at their disposal. From the CIAside, incidentally, this statement was described as complete nonsense. 227 Only in the summer of 1995were transatlantic relations to improve somewhat, although the Americans persevered in not passing on allintelligence about Bosnia to the British.The American-Canadian intelligence alliance may probably be described as the mostharmonious, in the sense that in this context probably information is shared completely. This close linkcame about through the very prominent Canadian role in the North American Air Defense Agreement(NORAD), which necessitated the most effective possible intelligence liaison. It so happens that the222 Interview with Pauline Neville-Jones, 15/11/01.223 Confidential interview (47).224 Urban, UK Eyes, pp. 238-241.225 Confidential information (80).226 Urban, UK Eyes, p. 241.227 Confidential interview (79).