C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

102Yugoslavia. This made the information position of the MIS/CO less than strong. A more precisereconstruction of the MIS/CO’s capacities, resources and staffing regarding Yugoslavia is given below.The MIS/Central Organization and BosniaAn analysis of the MIS reports in the period 1992-1995 reveals that intelligence on Bosnia was gatheredon all sorts of levels. This happened firstly at the MIS/CO Intelligence Staff, where processing andreporting was carried out on the political, economic and strategic terrain. Strategic intelligence wasprimarily intended for the political, administrative and military leaders (Minister, Junior Minister,Secretary-General and CDS). The Head of Intelligence Staff was responsible for the coordination andfine-tuning of the reporting. The department was subdivided into a Military Analysis Bureau and aPolitical-Economic Analysis Bureau. 463 It employed 12 staff in total, who mainly studied strategicdevelopments in the fields of politics, economics and the military in the CIS, the Middle East, Surinamand the Balkans. The MIS/CO personnel capacity was insufficient to allow the Balkans to be handledproperly. From 1996, after the final reorganization, this support department was expanded from 12 to45 FTEs. 464 Only one analyst worked almost full time on the Balkans, but he also had to coverdevelopments in Surinam. This one-man outfit was also given little or no guidance: the analyst had todetermine his own policy and occupied himself mainly with political-strategic developments. Yugoslaviawas a target at the MIS/CO from 1988 onwards. This is when the first signals began to arrive that allwas not well. According to insiders, the war in Yugoslavia (in spite of Dutchbat) was not given highpriority. ‘The Berlin Wall didn’t fall at the MIS until years later’, according to one analyst. 465Where sources were concerned, the MIS/CO Intelligence Staff had only rare access to Sigint.The relationship of the MIS/CO with special intelligence gathering bodies such as the TIVC inAmsterdam or the 898 th Army Signals Battalion in Eibergen was in fact almost non-existent. TheMIS/CO mainly had to make do with Open Source Intelligence (Osint) and sometimes with materialsupplied by UNPROFOR. Approximately 80% of all intelligence came from these sources. TheMIS/CO also received information on Bosnia from Dutchbat, UNCivPol, UNMOs, ECMM (theEuropean monitoring mission) observers and, initially, from the Military Attaché in Belgrade, who waslater recalled. Further intelligence was obtained from the TIVC and NATO, and the political analysesthat the BVD sent to the CVIN.The MISs of the Armed Forces also supplied intelligence to the MIS/CO, but the MIS/Armyonly sent finished intelligence to the MIS/CO, and not the material on which it was based. It wastherefore never possible for the MIS/CO’s only available Balkan analyst to independently check thesources for reliability. A telling detail in this connection: the MIS/Army had English-Dutch translatorsat its disposal, but the MIS/CO did not. The Ministry of Defence made no additional effort to expandthe capacity of the MIS/CO. One analyst continued to bear the complete responsibility for Yugoslavia,and received no support whatsoever. As a consequence, the MIS/CO was never actually able to make athorough analyses of its own but had to rely completely on the finished intelligence product of theMIS/Army. The MIS/CO was never allowed to make direct contact with Dutch staff officers in Tuzla,Sarajevo or Zagreb. Everything ran via the MIS/Army. The three heads of the MIS at the timeconfirmed the picture outlined here regarding the information position of the MIS/CO.Neither did the MIS/CO have imagery from satellites or U-2 spy planes at its disposal. Itoccasionally received material from the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the Italian MIS (the ServizioInformazioni e Sicurezza Militare or SISMI), the Danish MIS (DDIS), the CIA or DIA. There was a securetelex link with most services. The US intelligence on Yugoslavia tended to be in-depth in the militarytacticalarea, but it lacked breadth in the sense of offering a complete political and military picture. 466463 Kluiters, Supplement, pp. 214 - 215.464 Confidential interview (27).465 Confidential interview (37).466 Interview with P.J. Duijn, 04/04/01.