C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

218The Americans also profited from intelligence from NATO member states through the backdoor. At that time the US General Hayden received Sigint as Director Intelligence of the US EuropeanCommand (EUCOM), an American national command outside the NATO lines of communication. Inthis capacity he was supported by a team of 60 Sigint experts from the NSA, that operated fromStuttgart, and from the Regional Sigint Operations Center at the US base Fort Gordon, which had thespecial task of providing Sigint support for this US EUCOM. This enabled the Americans to combinetheir own information from intercepts with the information gathered for them by NATO memberstates. An American intelligence officer stated with regard to this: ‘if the NSA knew, Stuttgart wouldknow’. 1160 All things considered, the Americans had considerable information available to them fromSigint, but the exchange with other countries was limited. The next question is whether this also appliedto the Sigint shared with the UNPROFOR staffs in Sarajevo and Zagreb. This seems indeed to be thecase: the American and other Sigint agencies shared some intelligence with UNPROFOR.In 1995 the Head of the intelligence staff in Zagreb was the Swedish officer Colonel Jan-IngeSvensson. He was assisted by his compatriot Lieutenant Colonel Ingmar Ljunggren, while the deputyintelligence officer was an American from the US Navy, Commander Morgan. The Swedes had nationalintelligence input at their disposal, and were also supplied with intelligence by the Americans, Frenchand British. The French and British intelligence was rated as ‘good’. One should bear in mind here thatSweden was not an ‘official’ member of NATO. Sometimes Svensson and Ljunggren received bothtactical and strategic Sigint, such as fragments of telephone calls between Generals Mladic and Perisic.Briefings were also held on the basis of Sigint. However, they also rated Humint as an important1161source.Another UNPROFOR staff member confirmed that the intelligence staff in Zagreb sometimesreceived tactical military Sigint. These intercepts were also occasionally translated into French forJanvier, partly so that the interpreter did not then have to translate the English text out loud and thusto prevent the Croatian intelligence service from eavesdropping on this. 1162 The fact that Janvier hadthis information has already been dealt with in Chapter 1.Some members of the intelligence staff in Zagreb also had access to valuable Sigint relating toBihac. This was obtained through the LOCE system and national channels. In addition, intelligenceofficers in Zagreb often monitored the communications traffic between local commanders andSarajevo, and they are even said to have monitored the regular telephone calls between their1163commanders in Zagreb and Sarajevo. Members of the UNMO intelligence staff in Zagreb confirmedthat they too had Sigint at their disposal. This is said to have originated from monitoring stations nearNaples. During a critical situation in Bihac in November 1994 the UNMO officers working there at thetime received copies of intercepts of communication between the Commander in Chief of the ABiH,Rasim Delic, and the ABiH General Dudakovic.What Sigint was exchanged regarding the attack on Srebrenica?In 1995 too, foreign monitoring services managed to intercept the communications traffic of the ABiHCommander in Chief Rasim Delic. An interviewed UNMO officer therefore wondered: ‘Why didn’t wereceive this sort of information regarding the fall of Srebrenica?’ 1164 The probable reason for this wasthat this Comint did not in fact exist, because the various Western services did not have good Sigintcoverage of Eastern Bosnia and thus were not able to monitor this area intensively.There are further indications that there was no Sigint that directly indicated that the attack onSrebrenica was imminent. A few days before the attack the Deputy Head of the intelligence section in1160 The head of the Balkan Sigint unit in Stuttgart at that time was Pat Donahue. Confidential interviews (6), (13) and (54).1161 Interviews with Jan-Inge Svensson and Ingmar Ljunggren, 04/11/99.1162 Confidential information (35).1163 Confidential interview (45).1164 Confidential interview (44).