C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

143Lake’s statement. 676 As a Canadian functionary in the same time remarked: ‘We are back to a world ofbig power politics and that is not kind to nations like Canada. We are just another troop contributornow, and no one is asking our opinion’. 677Lake had evidently paid no attention whatever to the safety of the UN troops on the ground,and had accordingly also seriously underestimated the possible reactions of the Bosnian Serbs to liftingthe arms embargo. According to the Canadians, most military analyses demonstrated that, even withsufficient arms, the ABiH would first require long-term training before any improvement in thecommand could occur. Ottawa, London and Paris, which all had ground forces in Bosnia, opposed thisinitiative. Although lift and strike was officially adhered to, it had now become clear to the Americanadministration that it would not be feasible, partly as a consequence of criticism from Europe. 678 TheChief Political Officer of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, Corwin, expressed it as follows:‘Any sign of lifting the embargo will encourage a wider war, and a wider warwill mean more refugees. The main reason why the European powers are in theformer Yugoslavia in the first place is to prevent refugee flows to their own679countries’.As David Hannay, Britain’s permanent representative at the UN from 1990-1995, acknowledged later,the failure to take decisive action at crucial moments in the conflict was more due to the tensionsbetween those member states with troops on the ground and those like the United States without.Whilst anxious not to undermine publicly the impression of allied unity, many NATO allies with troopson the ground were markedly reluctant. According to Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, formerly chairingthe JIC and later leader of the UK delegation at Dayton, Ohio, the allies for a long time frustrated eachother and were unable either to convince others of their position, or to concede to a differentviewpoint. 680 And Boutros-Ghali cynically remarked: Washington devised a way to gain domesticpolitical benefit from tough talk about air strikes, knowing that it was shielded from acting because itsEuropean allies would never agree to put their personnel serving with UNPROFOR in danger. 681In the spring of 1993, there were various spheres of influence that affected the United States.After the Gulf War it was payback time for the United States: there was an expectation in the Arabworld (especially Saudi Arabia) that Washington would support the Bosnian Muslims. Furthermore,there was great pressure on the American administration from the media and from Congress, whichwas dominated by Republicans. In June 1993, Clinton received the head of the Saudi Arabianintelligence service, Prince Turki al Faisal, who was a close adviser to his uncle, the King. The Princeurged Clinton to take the lead in the military assistance to Bosnia. The American administration did notdare to do so: the fear of a rift within NATO was too great. However, the United States did considerthe Saudi Arabian signal to be important, and therefore a new strategy was elaborated. Its architect wasto be Richard Holbrooke, who started to look for a way to arm the Bosnian Muslims. In the summer of1993, the Pentagon - the American ministry of defence - was said to have drawn up a plan for armsassistance to the ABiH, which included supplies of AK-47s and other small arms. This operation was todemand almost three hundred C-130 Hercules transport aircraft flights. The weapons were going tohave to come from former Warsaw Pact stocks. The plan was rejected, however, for fear that it wouldleak out and to prevent protest from the European allies. 682676 Confidential interviews (2) and (62).677 Norman Hillmer and Dean Oliver, ‘Canada and the Balkans, in: Schmidt, A History of NATO, p. 82.678 James Risen, ‘Administration Defends Its OK of Bosnia Arms’, The Los Angeles Times, 04/08/96 and Owen, BalkansOdyssey, p. 73. See also: Jason DeParle, ‘The man inside Bill Clinton’s foreign policy’, The New York Times, 20/08/95.679 Corwin, Dubious Mandate. p. 85.680 Pauline Neville-Jones, ‘Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia’, Survival, Vol. 38 (Winter 1996-97) 4, p. 64.681 Mats Berdal, ‘Relations Between NATO and the UN’, Schmidt, A History of NATO, pp. 61-64.682 Paul Quinn-Judge. ‘US Denies Giving Arms’, The Boston Globe, 18/11/94.