C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

342evidence suggests that a major build-up of troops and heavy weapons by the VRS occurred prior to theoffensive.’ 1919 Akashi declared that the possibilities for monitoring the military activities of the VRS,apart from static OPs, were very limited. The exchange of national intelligence between countries wasgoverned by bilateral treaties to which the UN was not party. Sometimes local ambassadors or nationalcontingents supplied extra information, but this did not happen in the case of Srebrenica. Furthermore,Akashi had received no additional intelligence relating to Zepa and Gorazde. Akashi continued with thenotable statement: ‘It would not be appropriate for us to attempt, at our level, to improve access tonational intelligence.’ 1920 In fact one might have expected just the opposite. In view of the threateningsituation for the other enclaves and the fate of the refugees, an order to gather extra intelligence wouldhave been highly defensible.A week later Akashi returned to Annan’s questions. The general issue of the availability ofintelligence and the problems with its dissemination were complex and required separate treatment.Some countries had access to a ‘very large pool of detailed tactical and strategic intelligence’. After all,Yugoslavia was an object of interest for all intelligence services. A part of the intelligence gathered bythe leading troop contributors was Sigint. This was ‘the most jealously guarded of all intelligenceproducts’. In the case of the US, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand this wasarranged through agreements and ‘sharing outside this agreement is simply not possible’, according toAkashi. This is not correct: it is permitted to share national intelligence products. He mentioned thatspecial arrangements had been created for senior officers to receive intelligence support from theirnational governments, but this exchange was ‘so surrounded by national caveats that it takesconsiderable effort and ingenuity to make use of it in any multi-national activity’. This led tounavoidable tensions which could better be solved among the military. After all, they were used to suchproblems.Akashi recommended Annan to review, when times were quieter, whether new mechanisms forthe operational aspects of peacekeeping should be created within the UN; these could serve the task ofgathering national intelligence to be made available to a special secure information unit 1921 at the NewYork headquarters. Akashi concluded with the following observation: ‘For the moment enquiries heresuggest that with the current group of TCNs [Troop Contributing Nations] and the support of NATOthe flow of intelligence is as efficient, timely, and detailed as it can be within the constraints ofindividual perceived national security considerations.’ 1922 It is not clear who prompted Akashi to saythis, but this conclusion certainly did not apply to all the troop-contributing countries at that moment.In June 1996 Akashi repeated in a conversation with Dutch Foreign Minister Van Mierlo that Janvier‘did not have the US intelligence and in fact had insufficient insights into the intentions of theSerbs’. 1923Annan later complained to the Netherlands Permanent Representative at the UN about the factthat ‘the UN was not given intelligence available to some allies about the imminent Serb attack’. Gameplayinghad been widespread. He referred to an article that had earlier been published in Time about adeal between the US and Milosevic, whereby the Serbs could take over the enclaves and the Croats thewestern part of Bosnia. 1924 And during a meeting of the NATO Council at which Annan was a guest, hehad declared that Srebrenica had involved an intelligence failure. At that time he had given no furtherexplanation. 1925 So, New York was in the dark too. 19261919 Confidential collection NIOD (7). Annan to Akashi, ‘situation in Srebrenica’, No. 2280, 11/07/95.1920 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 239, File 6/15. Akashi to Annan, Z-1147, 12/07/95.1921 Akashi was apparently still unable to utter the word ‘intelligence’.1922 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 139, File Crypto Fax In 46. Akashi to Annan, Z-1189, 18/07/95.1923 MoD, DCBC. Van Mierlo to PR New York, No. 183, 07/06/96.1924 MoD, DCBC. PVVN Biegman to Foreign Affairs, No. 389, 05/06/96.1925 NMFA, PVNATO. Feith to Foreign Affairs, No. 1467, 03/11/95.1926 See also: United Nations, Srebrenica Report, 15/11/99, §486, p. 143.