C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

314Speculation was rife not only in the press. This question was also put to Akashi by New York.On the day of the fall of Srebrenica Annan declared that the situation raised serious and urgentquestions for UNPROFOR:‘How was it that UNPROFOR was taken unaware again, as with Gorazde andBihac last year, by the true extent of Serb intentions? What intelligenceresources do you [Akashi] have and what information, if any, was provided toUNPROFOR by those troop-contributing nations with intelligence-gatheringassets in the area?’Annan continued: ‘I find it difficult to accept that no “early warning” was possible when the evidencesuggests that a major build-up of troops and heavy weapons by the VRS occurred prior to theoffensive’. 1724 It was to prove no easy matter to answer this.The central question in this chapter is whether intelligence and security services or other directlyinvolved parties had prior knowledge of the VRS plans for the attack on Srebrenica, or in other wordswhether they were forewarned. Were there intelligence indications before the attack that the VRSplanned to reduce the enclave in size or possible to conquer it entirely? And if these indications werereceived in time, who gathered or withheld this dramatic information, and why?The answer is to be found in the intelligence situation of various intelligence and securityservices on the eve of the fall. In the process, a distinction must be drawn between ‘strategic’ and‘tactical’ prior knowledge, or forewarning. Strategic prior knowledge relates to the patterns ofexpectation extending over a long period. This knowledge existed in plenty, because the Bosnian Serbshad often declared that they would one day take over the enclaves. Various officials of one Europeanintelligence service thus expected that the eastern enclaves would be conquered sooner or later, andthey were not surprised when this finally happened. 1725 A memorandum from the MIS/Army written inJune 1995 predicted that the tension around the eastern enclaves would continue unabated, and wouldincrease even further if the smuggling of weapons and ammunition from Zepa to Srebrenica were tocontinue. An attack on the enclave was not expected, but attempts to create better lines ofcommunication were forecast. 1726 But as a member of the MIS/Army declared after the fall: suchstrategic indications offer little or no practical insight. The core of intelligence work is formed bytactical indications, such as troop concentrations, tanks, trucks and new trenches. 1727If these tactical indications were not noted, then the attack on Srebrenica should indeed beregarded as an ‘intelligence failure’. Section 2 first provides a describtion of this term. The primarycauses of such a failure are described; this may relate to a lack of intelligence, or to a failure to correctlyinterpret, or to evaluate in time, the intelligence which did exist.Section 3 then examines strategic prior knowledge. The issue here is whether it was expectedthat the Srebrenica enclave would disappear in the long term, either as a result of political negotiationsor through an attack. Section 4 deals with intelligence aspects of the actual course of the attack on theenclave. 1728 Section 5 turns to the information situation of UNPROFOR, and looks at the tactical priorknowledge in more detail. The question asked here is whether any prior knowledge based on hardindications really existed. This involves an examination of the Signals Intelligence (Sigint), ImageryIntelligence (Imint) and Human Intelligence (Humint) gathered by the various national intelligenceservices. An important question is whether this information was shared with the UN or the troopcontributingnations. Then the various parties in the enclave are dealt with, such as Dutchbat, theJCOs, UNHCR, NGOs and the ABiH. The Sigint capabilities of the ABiH are analysed. If these players1724 Confidential collection (7); Annan to Akashi, ‘situation in Srebrenica’, No. 2280, 11/07/95.1725 Confidential interview (48).1726 MoD, SMG, IntSum MIS/Army, Department I&V, 010609-070695, 07/06/95.1727 MoD, SMG, Report of a conversation with an Military Intelligence Service official, 03/08/95.1728 The attack itself is described in detail in Chapter 6 of Part III of the main Srebrenica report.