C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

13with setting the objectives of grand strategy and ensuring that military force is exercised for purposes ofachieving national interests. 17In addition, a peacekeeping operation needs operational intelligence, which has to guide themost effective use of resources and manpower for the execution of the mandate. This is especiallyimportant in a fairly fluid political and military setting, where it would be concerned with the intentions,plans and capabilities of the warring parties, the nature of the military activities (conventional militaryactions, guerrilla warfare, ethnic cleansing), the military objectives of the parties, and how theirpropaganda is organized.At the same time, tactical intelligence is necessary in support of the troops on the ground, sothat they are able to carry out peacekeeping activities, such as monitoring a ceasefire or a suspension ofhostilities. Examples might include the locations of ceasefire lines, trenches, minefields andcheckpoints. After all, the intentions and capabilities of all warring parties, especially in a local area,must be mapped out if the UN mission is to have any chance of success. 18 Finally, reliable intelligenceis a prerequisite for minimizing the risk to troops on the ground and aircraft in the air. 19 In brief,credible and sound intelligence is of great importance, and perhaps crucial, to the success of apeacekeeping operation.The above arguments would appear to be ample justification for devoting considerableattention to the intelligence component of peacekeeping operations. However, it can be deduced fromthe quoted statements made by Force Commanders and Deputy Force Commanders that this was notthe case. This chapter therefore discusses the difficult relationship between the UN and intelligence,which the peoples’ organization has actually wrestled with since its foundation.Before paying further attention to this issue, Section 2 first defines intelligence, and explains thevarious categories of intelligence.Section 3 examines the history of the UN’s difficult relationship with intelligence gatheringduring peacekeeping operations. This is illustrated by the words ‘In 1960 it was suggested that the word"intelligence" should be banned from the lexicon of the United Nations’, which have been attributed tothe commander of the UN operations in Congo at the time. 20 Intelligence has apparently been regardedas a ‘dirty word’ in UN parlance. 21 Section 4 dwells on the UN culture regarding the use anddeployment of intelligence in UN operations. It raises the question of whether there has been anychange in the past fifty years.Section 5 covers the (mainly American) intelligence support of the UN in general and of UNpeacekeeping operations in particular. The fact is that some intelligence input was forthcoming,especially when American ground forces were involved. Section 6 presents a view of the war in Bosniaand the UNPROFOR intelligence structure, and discusses the capabilities that the UN forces hadavailable for gathering and disseminating intelligence. Resistance from the UN notwithstanding, the factthat some efforts were made to gather intelligence was not actually so remarkable. As one authorremarked:‘The need for intelligence is being increasingly felt by both the UN and bystates contributing to peacekeeping operations. Particularly in more complexand fluid situations, intelligence will be crucial in achieving the goals of themission as laid down by the UN Security Council’.17 Richard L. Russell, ‘CIA’s Strategic Intelligence in Iraq’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117 (Summer 2002) 2, p. 193.18 David A. Charters, ‘Out of the Closet: Intelligence Support for Post-Modernist Peacekeeping’, The Pearson Papers, No. 4,Intelligence and Peacekeeping, Halifax, 1999, pp. 42-44.19 Hugh Smith, ‘Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping’, Survival, Vol. 36 (1994) 3, p. 176.20 A. Walter Dorn, ‘The Cloak and the Blue Beret: Limitations on Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping’, International Journal ofIntelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 12 (1998) 4, p. 414.21 Sir David Ramsbotham, ‘Analysis and Assessment for Peacekeeping Operations’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 10(October 1995) 4, p. 162.