C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

329the enclaves in the very near future. The tks [tanks] were not reported as beingon low loaders so it is assumed that they will not be going too far rememberingthat DUTCHBAT will shortly be in the process of rotating and the BSA [VRS]may wish to test the new boys out’. 1830This test came even faster than ‘the near future’ and Dutchbat was completely unaware of the peril.This danger showed itself totally unexpectedly in the early morning of 6 July, when shells landed in theenclave. The fact that this marked the start of the VRS attack on the enclave penetrated only slowly tothe higher echelons.It does not seem likely that the UNMOs had noted the preparations, otherwise they would havereported this to Dutchbat. The UNMOs were a separate organization. When the Canadian battalionarrived in Srebrenica, the UNMOs took up accommodation in the Post Office building in the centre ofSrebrenica because of the central location and the good telecommunications facilities. 1831 According tothe UNMO interpreter Emir Suljagic the UN and Dutchbat should have known about the impendingattack. According to him, a month before the attack several UNMOs travelled from Srebrenica toSarajevo. En route, about twenty kilometres from Srebrenica, they reportedly saw large numbers oftanks, soldiers and weapons, including SA-3 missiles. According to Suljagic it was obvious thatsomething was going to happen. He reportedly also passed on this intelligence to the ABiH. 1832 But infact these observations had nothing to do with the attack on Srebrenica because at that point thepreparations had not yet begun.The alarming vision can also be found in claims that the UNMOs had prepared a confidentialreport on 2 June regarding the presence of the Arkan Tigers (a notorious Serb paramilitary unit) in thevicinity of Bratunac. According to the author Hartmann, Arkan’s reputation ‘aurait dû alerter les hautscommandements militaires de Sarajevo et de Zagreb’ (‘should have alerted the military high commands inSarajevo and Zagreb’). The UNMOs in the region should have concluded that the Arkan Tigers ‘wereevil enough to cleanse “an enclave” and emphasizing the probability of an offensive in the near future’.This report of Arkan dated from the end of May, however, at a time when the VRS preparations had1833not yet begun.Westerman and Rijs also refer to reports from the UNMOs, who concluded from the arrival ofthe Arkan Tigers that the VRS was not able to conquer the enclave. The Arkan Tigers were needed todo this. 1834 Apart from the issue of whether this is a correct estimate of the military strength of theVRS, it must be established that the UNMOs did not present hard and concrete indications for acoming attack. Statements were confined to vague suggestions that something like that might possiblyhappen.It seems that the UNMOs observed nothing of the VRS preparations. According to theCanadian UNMO Bob Patchett, who remained in the enclave until the end of June 1995, no VRSbuild-up had been noted. In the months of April and May it was even possible to cross the ceasefireline to talk to VRS soldiers, which at the time comprised local military personnel. They asked aboutpeople in the enclave whom they knew and about the state of certain houses. Patchett was the onlyUNMO who was allowed to leave on 23 June; he had not expected to be permitted to travel viaBratunac. He saw no military build-up or checkpoints in the town. He also saw no artillery positionsclose to the bridge over the Drina. For weeks the VRS had been complaining that the ABiH had been1830 MoD, SMG. HQ Sector NE Daily Milinfosum from 031700B to 041700B Jul 95. UN Confi. The report of the tanks tothe south of Zvornik came from a UNHCR Field Officer. MoD, SMG, LO Team to UNMOs Srebrenica, Milinfo, 05-07-9516:46.1831 Interview with Emir Suljagic, 24/05/99.1832 Interview with Emir Suljagic, 23/11/97.1833 Florence Hartmann, ‘Chronologie d’une négligence criminelle: le génocide de Srebrenica’, in: Allain, e.a., L’ex Yougoslavieand Europe, p. 115, and ‘AICG call to indict General Janvier’, Bosnia Report, No. 1, November-December 1997, p. 3.1834 Westerman & Rijs, Het Zwartste Scenario, p. 149.