Shukman, H. (ed), Ag<strong>en</strong>ts for Change. <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Services <strong>in</strong> the 21st C<strong>en</strong>tury, London, 2000.Silber, L. and A. Little, The <strong>de</strong>ath of Yugoslavia, London, 1996.Simms, Br<strong>en</strong>dan, Unf<strong>in</strong>est Hour. Brita<strong>in</strong> and the <strong>de</strong>struction of Bosnia, London, 2001.Sluik/Kurpershoek (red.), <strong>De</strong> Duiveljager. Het verhaal <strong>van</strong> e<strong>en</strong> Ne<strong>de</strong>rlands soldaat <strong>in</strong> Kroatischedi<strong>en</strong>st, Amsterdam 2000.Smith, Michael, New Cloaks. Old Daggers. How Brita<strong>in</strong>’s Spies Came <strong>in</strong> From The Cold, London,1996.Sp<strong>en</strong>ce, Cameron, All Necessary Measures, London, 1999.Sremic, D., War of Words: Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Tackles the Yugoslav Conflict, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton DC, 2000.Stad<strong>en</strong>, A. <strong>van</strong>, <strong>De</strong> fuik <strong>van</strong> Srebr<strong>en</strong>ica, D<strong>en</strong> Haag, 1997.Stankovic, Milos, Trusted Mole. A Soldier’s Journey <strong>in</strong>to Bosnia’s Heart of Darkness, London, 2001.Stolt<strong>en</strong>berg, Th. <strong>en</strong> K. Ei<strong>de</strong>, <strong>De</strong> tus<strong>en</strong>e dag<strong>en</strong><strong>en</strong>: Fredsmeklere på Balkan, Oslo, 1996.Stover, E. <strong>en</strong> G. 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From Top Secret to Maximum Security, Ed<strong>in</strong>burgh, 2001.U.Ulfkotte, Udo, Verschlusssache BND, Munch<strong>en</strong>, 1997.Urban, Mark, UK Eyes Alpha. 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387Woolsey, R.J., Partners for Peace: Str<strong>en</strong>gth<strong>en</strong><strong>in</strong>g Collective Security for the 21st C<strong>en</strong>tury: a Report ofthe Global Policy Project The United Nations Association of the United States of America, New York,<strong>1992</strong>.Y.Yost, D.S., NATO Transformed: the Alliances New Roles <strong>in</strong> International Security, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton D.C.,1998.Z.Zimmermann, W., Orig<strong>in</strong>s of a catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its <strong>de</strong>stroyers: America’s last ambassadortells what happ<strong>en</strong>ed and why, New York, 1996.Zoll<strong>in</strong>g, H. and Höhne, H., Pullach <strong>in</strong>tern, Hamburg, 1970.Contributions to BooksA.Aid, Matthew M., ‘Not So Anonymous: Part<strong>in</strong>g the Veil of Secrecy About the National SecurityAg<strong>en</strong>cy’, <strong>in</strong> Athan G. Theoharis (ed.), A Culture of Secrecy: The Governm<strong>en</strong>t Versus the People’s Right to Know,Lawr<strong>en</strong>ce, KS, 1998.Aid, Matthew M., and <strong>Wiebes</strong>, Cees, ‘Introduction on the importance of SIGINT <strong>in</strong> the Cold War’, <strong>in</strong>:Matthew Aid and Cees <strong>Wiebes</strong> (ed.) Secrets of Signals <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g the Cold War and Beyond, London,2001.Aldrich, Richard J., ‘GCHQ and Sig<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> the Early Cold War 1945 - 1970’, <strong>in</strong>: Matthew Aid and Cees<strong>Wiebes</strong> (ed.) Secrets of Signals <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g the Cold War and Beyond, London, 2001.All<strong>en</strong>, Robert J., ‘<strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Support for Peace Operations’, <strong>in</strong>: Perry L. Pickert, <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> for Multilateral<strong>De</strong>cision and Action, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton DC, Jo<strong>in</strong>t Military <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> College, 1997.C.Copley, Gregory, ‘<strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> and the Iraqi Invasion: Why Did So Many Services Fail?’, <strong>in</strong>: Strategic Policy,September 1990.Christianson, David L., "Signals <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong>," <strong>in</strong> Gerald W. Hopple and Bruce W. Watson (eds), TheMilitary <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Community, Boul<strong>de</strong>r, 1986.D.Dreyfuss, Robert, ‘TECHINT: The NSA, the NRO, and NIMA’, <strong>in</strong>: Graig Eis<strong>en</strong>drath, NationalInsecurity. U.S. <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> After the Cold War, Phila<strong>de</strong>lphia, 2000.F.Fort, Randall M., ‘Economic Espionage’, <strong>in</strong>: R. Godson, E.R. May and G. Schmitt, U.S. <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> at theCrossroads. Ag<strong>en</strong>da for Reform, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, <strong>1995.</strong>Faligot, Roger, ‘France, Sig<strong>in</strong>t and the Cold War’, <strong>in</strong>: Matthew Aid and Cees <strong>Wiebes</strong> (ed.) Secrets ofSignals <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g the Cold War and Beyond, London, 2001.G.Godson, R. ‘Counter<strong>in</strong>tellig<strong>en</strong>ce: An Introduction’, <strong>in</strong>: Roy Godson, <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Requirem<strong>en</strong>ts for the 1980s:counter<strong>in</strong>tellig<strong>en</strong>ce, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, 1980Godson, R., ‘Covert Action: neither exceptional tool nor magic bullet’, <strong>in</strong>: R. Godson, E.R. May and G.Schmitt, U.S. <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> at the Crossroads. Ag<strong>en</strong>da for Reform, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, 1995H.Hannay, Sir David, ‘<strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> and <strong>in</strong>ternational ag<strong>en</strong>cies’, <strong>in</strong>: Ha<strong>rol</strong>d Shukman (editor), Ag<strong>en</strong>ts forChange. <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Services <strong>in</strong> the 21st C<strong>en</strong>tury, London, 2000.Hartmann, Flor<strong>en</strong>ce, ‘Chronologie d’une néglig<strong>en</strong>ce crim<strong>in</strong>elle: le génoci<strong>de</strong> <strong>de</strong> Srebr<strong>en</strong>ica’, <strong>in</strong>: M.F.Alla<strong>in</strong>, e.a., L’ex Yougoslavie <strong>en</strong> Europe. <strong>De</strong> la faillite <strong>de</strong>s Démocraties au Processus <strong>de</strong> Paix, Paris, 1997.Hays III, Joseph G., ‘Oversight of U.S. <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> Support to UN Peacekeep<strong>in</strong>g Operations’, <strong>in</strong>: Perry L.Pickert, <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> for Multilateral <strong>De</strong>cision and Action, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton DC, Jo<strong>in</strong>t Military <strong>Intellig<strong>en</strong>ce</strong> College,1997.
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33Virginia, where it was decided wh
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41played an important role. For thi
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43any indication of action taken. T
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45verification flights by unmanned
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47NATO’s most important troop-con
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51Another problem was that good (no
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70Republika Srpska. The work was no
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74involved in intelligence activiti
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76Forces were said to have received
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78exchange, then generally speaking
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80Chapter 3Dutch intelligence and s
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82reorganization of the MIS. In 199
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84commotion flaring up within the s
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86intelligence. 394 Until that time
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88their relief goods for Bosnia tha
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90The BVD collaborated closely on Y
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94cutbacks recommended by the Van I
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97information without compromising
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99Yugoslavia did not prove to be a
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101MIS/CO. Intelligence sharing wit
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103German, Italian and Danish intel
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105Originally, the European Bureau
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107that an insight was obtained usi
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109They made civil and military ris
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111In other words, the flow of info
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113three tasks: looking for indicat
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115In reality the MIS/Army function
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117his benefit, and many others. It
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119too. This had already been estab
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121negative assessment: not to go t
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123capacity of the UN, but as descr
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125organizations that could possibl
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127Department, the Counterintellige
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129MIS/Air Force officer went to Tu
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131entering into close relationship
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133One envelope contained several f
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135any indications of continuous gu
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137more and more clear, turned a de
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139intended to monitor the border c
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141opinion. 665 After Croatia had n
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143Lake’s statement. 676 As a Can
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145engage these countries, but each
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147Later that day, Galbraith report
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149form of photos taken by spy sate
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151In the summer and autumn of 1994
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153starting to have concerns about
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155preferred provider of weapons to
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157Because of the logistical useful
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159An Islamic humanitarian organiza
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161and 1 rocket launcher for a TF-8
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163the convoys from Croatia with ar
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165The attempt at a cover-upAs ment
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167Force Commander and with General
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169urging it, because they suspecte
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171General and researcher, Brendan
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173mm guns, 2000 pistols, 211,000 h
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175divergent opinions on the Serbia
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177had total freedom of movement al
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179violations were observed. These
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181and Jugoslavija Publik. Accordin
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183command and the rival Iranian, S
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185much contact with the population
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187from the enclave a total of 140
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189The third party country strategy
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191the warring factions, namely tha
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193Chapter 5The Signals Intelligenc
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195In addition Comint can be import
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197policymakers, however. As a resu
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199A second disadvantage of Sigint,
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201All efforts can of course also b
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203125 linguists to provide transla
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205time intercepts involved here we
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207conclusion that the contribution
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209happened during the Gulf War, wh
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211The Gulf War showed that there w
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213Despite this reservation there i
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215The NSA and CIA, as well as GCHQ
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217million messages, sent via Intel
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219Zagreb, Morgan, - Svensson was o
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221Monitoring targets in SerbiaOffi
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223jar’, said an US intelligence
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225Naturally the Serbs had taken pr
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227confirmed that monitoring walkie
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229The same month new articles appe
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231‘They more or less admitted th
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233have been part of a Bosnian gove
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235get O’Grady out of Bosnian Ser
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237as the Balkans. Two to three yea
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239Comint archive and other archive
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241Bokhoven Couzy supported him in
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243communications traffic of UNPROF
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245Moreover, the NSA is reported to
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247The role of the Netherlands: no
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249made by Krstic and other Bosnian
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251messages, which were intercepted
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253later treetops were used. Throug
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255Conclusions on the interception
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257equipment, planned operations, t
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259made it impossible to follow the
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261community that the situation was
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263commander of the Bosnian-Serb Dr
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265to headquarters. The Comint oper
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267Intelligence Community had no ac
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269aid being sent to Sarajevo. Both
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271established in 1991, also receiv
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273crypto telephone and fax with th
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275to Baxter, the Military Assistan
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277Chapter 7Imagery Intelligence in
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2792. What instruments were availab
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281would leave around 18 hours out
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283and has provided policy-makers w
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285operational in Bosnia, like the
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287lines and troop movements. After
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289around Sarajevo and Gorazde. Thi
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291that especially American, French
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293So, it would have been impossibl
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2953. With whom was imagery intelli
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297available. 1606 The head of the
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299war crimes had probably been per
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301a US national asset (unknow is w
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303Mostar and loitered in Zepa area
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305Albright shows the photosOn 10 A
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307was taken some time in 1999, eve
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309tracking the civilian toll had v
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311solution to such problems in ad
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313Chapter 8Was ‘Srebrenica’ an
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315gathered intelligence, then it m
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317the VRS attack should aim to tak
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319In January 1995 a European intel
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321stated that the deployment of th
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323The Military Intelligence Servic
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325by the Norwegian Brigadier Gener
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327Bosnian Serbs decided that they
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329the enclaves in the very near fu
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331enclave was seriously confined b
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333The VRS’s most important commu
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