C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

175divergent opinions on the Serbian supplies to the VRS. In a comprehensive report, the Bosniangovernment complained about the Serbian support to the VRS. From August 1994 to July 1995, Serbiaand Montenegro are alleged to have supplied to the Bosnian Serbs a total of 512 tanks, 506 APCs, 120howitzers, 130 other artillery pieces, 6 MIG 29s, SU-25 and SU-27 aircraft and more than 20helicopters. These were formidable quantities, enough to equip an entire army. For this reason alone,these Bosnian quantities were implausible. According to Nieminen, these data were incorrect, and thechecks at this border were watertight. He pointed out that the checking was not random, but that everycar was inspected and completely investigated. Observers were even authorized to have cars or trucksdismantled. 897According to staff of a European intelligence service, the sanctions did not work on the Drina,however. For example, the observers had instructions to withdraw immediately in the event of danger.The Serbs usually fired a series of salvos in the air as darkness fell to frighten the observers, who thenwithdrew rapidly. On the basis of reliable intelligence data, this service came to the conclusion thatmilitary equipment was often transferred at night from Serbia to Srpska, usually consisting of 2 tanks(T-54), 2 APCs, 2 trucks with artillery, 2 buses with soldiers of the Yugoslav army and 2 trucks withfuel.This was the normal pattern of Serbian support to the VRS; they also considered the sanctioncommittee to be a political mission. It was confirmed from the side of the VRS that much fuel hadbeen supplied from Bulgaria and Romania to Serbia, which was forwarded in transit to the VRS. Trainwagons crossed the border, and fuel also arrived on the Danube. The observers were repeatedly put onthe spot by a skipper who would say that he was going to sail on, or otherwise dump the oil in theDanube. 898 However, General Nieminen persisted in claiming to the NIOD that reports of deliveries oftanks, APCs and trucks over the Drina had no basis in truth. If Milosevic supported the VRS on a largescale, then the question remains as to how this happened. Milosevic ran enormous political risks indoing so. What is clear is that support was provided from Serbia in the form of soldiers, technicalrecommendations, integrated air defence and financial assistance, but therefore not in the form oflarge-scale military equipment. 899A senior White House adviser confirmed this. He had never seen convincing evidence that armshad been delivered to the Bosnian Serbs via the Drina. The road via Croatia, however, was open forthis purpose. He called the embargo ‘fairly effective’ but admitted that there were leaks. According tothis source, intelligence on the violations was all Sigint, but it was not permitted to share thisinformation with foreign intelligence services. What particularly stung the senior official was thatWashington had failed in bringing about a financial embargo, because central banks in the EU, such asthe Bank of England and the Bundesbank did not cooperate. The Security Council resolutions did nottake this into account, and the banks hid behind national legislation. The particular culprit here was theAustrian central bank. According to this official, no progress was booked on this point against ‘serbiaIncorporated’. Milosevic was able to launder his money via Cyprus. Money was also laundered inMoscow, which was made easier by the state of the Russian banking system. Otherwise, according tothis official, the war could have finished earlier, because then Milosevic would no longer have been ableto pay the VRS officers. 900According to Sarajevo, in addition to arms and ammunition, other items were supplied to theBosnian Serbs. The Bosnian government claimed that 8700 tons of fuel were supplied. 901 According toNieminen, Serbia supplied the oil mainly via the Krajina, and there was a back door via Croatia becauseof the relationship between Tudjman and Milosevic. The problem was that the mandate of his mission897 Interview with Tauno Nieminen and Aaro Suonio, 25/05/00.898 Confidential interview (48). See also: Robert Block, ‘serbs march in secret to the aid of Bosnian kin’, The Independent,05/07/95.899 Interview with Tauno Nieminen and Aaro Suonio, 25/05/00.900 Confidential interview (14).901 NMFA, PVNY. Biegman to Foreign Affairs, attached Bosnian memo, 04/09/95