C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

347leadership of the Republika Srpska for political reasons, according to an analyst. If the VRS shouldnonetheless take action, then this would probably be confined to OPs; occupation of large sections ofthe enclave was thought unlikely for the time being. 1952 At the end of June the MIS/army did notexpect any major changes in the positions of the warring factions. 1953A briefing by the MIS/Army on 5 July dealt with the chances of an attack. Which advantagesand disadvantages could this have for the VRS? One reason to attack was that the VRS needed asuccess that could not be achieved elsewhere. Furthermore, this could be conducted with relatively littleeffort and without many casualties on its own side. Moreover, the VRS would then have a free hand inEastern Bosnia and could significantly shorten the line of confrontation. A disadvantage was that theBosnian Serbs would be seen as the guilty party and the Americans would urge reprisals. There were avariety of reasons not to attack. The ABiH in Gorazde was strong and well-organized. Zepa, in contrastto Gorazde, did not provide any improvement to road and river communications. The analysts believedthat Srebrenica could indeed be taken in a relatively short time, but that the VRS would have to makeconsiderable sacrifices to do it. It was easier to work for collapse from within. Moreover, the enclavecould be taken piece by piece.It was already possible to use the southern road following the taking of OP-E. From April 1993onwards the road lay on VRS territory with the exception of a small section at OP-E. The bauxite minewas also in VRS hands, but lay within reach of the ABiH. Taking the entire enclave could be attractivein that it would provide a good north-south route. If the VRS decided to take apart the enclave piece bypiece, then considerable difficulties could be expected with the ABiH. The Muslims could isolate OPs,use UN troops as a shield or kill a number of UN soldiers and then give the VRS the blame. The ABiHcould attack Dutchbat to gain heavier weapons, or isolate the battalion by surrounding it with civilians.This could be organized in a few hours and would render Dutchbat immobile. 1954 The MIS/Armybriefing thus did not give indications of an attack, even though a certain predictive value could not bedenied.The MIS/Army therefore did not have prior knowledge. The intelligence section of the ArmyCrisis Staff had its suspicions, but it never expressed these out loud. In the daily briefings it constantlystuck to the MIS/Army analysis. All parties involved thought that the attack was aimed at the southernroad and the adjacent bauxite mines. In the worst case Dutchbat would be forced back into a small(VRS ‘recognized’ Safe Area) around Potocari. This reduction in size would have roughly correspondedto the Bosnian Serb interpretation of the enclave borders, i.e. the actual demilitarized area of April19551993. According to one MIS official the MIS/Army had started to receive reports of movementsaround the enclave as early as the end of June. Communications links were being laid by the VRS alongthe line of confrontation, which indicated the desire to communicate securely. Buses had beenobserved too. What did this mean? Tanks had also been reported and heard by OPs, but it wasconsistently assumed that the VRS was interested only in the southern road. 1956The Head of Intelligence Production and also acting Head of Intelligence of the MIS/Armydeclared, however, that there were ‘absolutely no’ tactical indicators that revealed a pattern.Observations from the enclave were particularly summary, and the only possible source of informationcould have been American UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles). But the Americans never passed thisintelligence to the Netherlands. However, the Dutch official forgot to mention that the Dutch F-16swere also very suitable TACRECCE assets which could have been used outside UNPROFOR. In thisrespect a senior US intelligence official complained to the author that it was all too easy to lament about1952 MoD, MIS/Army. INTSUM 109/95, 09/06/95.1953 MoD, MIS/Army. INTSUM 120/95, 26/06/95.1954 MoD, MIS/Army. Notes on briefing dates 5 July1995. No author indicated.1955 MoD, SMG. Report of conversation with Colonel Dedden, 10/08/95.1956 Confidential interview (38).