C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

304where comparisons with the photos of 5 July revealed that digging had also taken place. 1660 At 18.12hours on 18 July, satellite intelligence on Srebrenica was also available in the US intelligencecommunity. A satellite had spotted two tanks in front of the headquarters at Potocari. The photos alsoshowed an APC in Glogova. 1661The fact that US Imint was available in this period emerged in Belgrade on 15 July, during thenegotiations on Srebrenica between Akashi, Bildt, Stoltenberg, Smith, Milosevic and Mladic. 1662 USImint (presumably from a U-2 or UAV) was on the table. It had been provided by the US Embassy inBelgrade and was causing Mladic serious discomfort. These photos, incidentally, were not the same asthose, which Albright presented to the Security Council.Albright’s photos came as a complete surprise to Bosnia-Hercegovina Command in general and1663to Smith in particular. Bosnia-Hercegovina Command (BHC) knew nothing of their existence.Again, this was not so much attributable to reluctance on the part of the Americans but rather to theinsecure connections with the Bosnian capital. An intelligence analyst with access to American Imintsaid that Satint of (the surroundings of) Srebrenica again became available on 19 July. The content ofthese photos is unknown. On the same day, it was announced that the Predators would no longer flyabove this area because of the situation around Zepa. Judging from their Deny Flight IntelligenceSummary, the analysts at the MIS/Air Force found this a remarkable message, especially consideringthat UAVs were perfect for performing such local reconnaissance operations. Regular aircraft could notdo it. On the other hand, the Deny Flight Intsum stated that the MIS analysts at the Air Force had theimpression that the VRS troops around Zepa were not pushing forward. There was no real need forthis, because the international community had already given up on Zepa and, according to the MIS/AirForce, an evacuation was being considered. 1664 This could indeed explain why the Predatorreconnaissance flights were halted above Zepa. Perhaps the fear of a repetition elsewhere of theatrocities of Srebrenica also played a role in this; apparently, the UAV had more important missions toperform. Paris reacted immediately. The French would step up its reconnaissance flights above Bosniabecause Paris thought that Washington was not sharing aerial photo intelligence with the allies. 1665After the fall of Srebrenica, the Dutch Chief of Defence Staff asked the United Nations ifdetailed satellite photos or UAV photos could be taken of the surroundings of Srebrenica and Bratunacto ascertain whether there were prison camps in the area. Minister Voorhoeve wanted to know whetherthis request had been productive and sent a memo to this effect to the deputy Chief of DefenceStaff. 1666 The Director of Atlantic Cooperation and Security at the Foreign Ministry also wanted moredetails. On 6 August, it had asked the UN Permanent Representative for further information on aerialphotos of men deported from Srebrenica. No photos were available at the NATO Situation Centre orIntelligence Division; NATO said that there may have been US satellite photos but that nationalintelligence was only shared with allies in exceptional cases.This did not deter the Dutch Permanent Representative from making inquiries of his Americancounterpart, who had sent out an all-stations call on the same day but had received no answer. The1667Permanent Representative thought that perhaps in this case the request would get a positive answer.The government had also asked Minister Voorhoeve if it could see Imint. 1668 The Chief of DefenceStaff, the Director of Atlantic Cooperation and Security and the minister did not have to wait long.1660 ICTY, Krstic Case, OTP Exhibits, Volume I, Ex. 9/3.1661 Confidential interview (54).1662 For example: Rohde, A Safe Area, pp. 309 - 3101663 Confidential interview (43).1664 MoD, DCBC, 1696. MID/Klu DFI (NATO secret), 19/07/95.1665 ‘Onwaarschijnlijk dat Belgen Zepa helpen evacueren’ (Belgians unlikely to help evacuate Zepa), De Standaard, 19/07/95.1666 MoD, PCDS, DE01108, Voorhoeve to PCDS, No. 26/95, 04/08/95.1667 NMFA, PVNATO, Permanent NATO representative to Foreign Affairs, No. 0017, 07/08/95.1668 Interview with C. Hilderink, 11/08/00.