C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

288John. M. Deutch, the later Director of the CIA, was a particularly staunch advocate of UAVs.As Defense Secretary, he had already argued for a broader deployment in July 1993. 1538 It was alsoknown at the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) of the Royal Netherlands Navy that the CIA was usingseven Predators. The ‘Periodic Intelligence Report’ of February 1995 stated that for some time the CIAhad been operating with this type of UAV above Bosnia. At the end of June 1995, the MIS/Air Forceinformed the MIS/Navy that the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) wanted to station thePredator in Albania for 60 days. 1539Qualitatively, the Predator was definitely the best UAV. 1540 This Medium-Altitude EnduranceUAV (MAE UAV) can operate day and night and has huge merits compared with most spy satellites. Ithas an infra-red sensor for reconnaissance and target recognition. An important mission of the MAEUAV is to gather Sigint. 1541 The Predator also delivers Imint in the form of photos, but it can producelive video footage as well. These UAVs constantly relayed Imint with a resolution of 30 centimetres toground stations. Thanks to zoom lenses this can provide sharp images. The UAV controllers on theground could therefore observe targets such as tanks, APCs and other military vehicles on the groundfrom an altitude of ten kilometres. From an altitude of five kilometres they could distinguish a tankfrom an APC and from 1,800 metres they could identify the type of tank. The UAV has a range of over800 kilometres and an endurance of 40 hours. It flies virtually silently at an altitude of 10,000 feet and itis more or less undetectable by radar systems, partly because it flies very slowly. 1542 The UAVs werelater guided to their targets by JSTARS. For instance, in 1996 the Predators were apparently capable ofsending live images of VRS activities in Northern and Central Bosnia to the USA with a delay of onesecond. 1543The deployment of UAVs in Operation Nomad Vigil became particularly relevant after thehostage-taking of UNPROFOR personnel in the spring of 1995. The shooting down of an AmericanF-16 on 2 June 1995 was the main reason for bringing additional Predators to the region. Only thenwere the operational activities of the UAVs stepped up from Gjader (Albania) in order to supportUNPROFOR and to prevent Serb air attacks in Bosnia. 1544 For example, on 5 June 1995, a UAVheading towards Kososka mountain was spotted close to the confrontation line at Drazevici in SectorSouth West. According to UNMO observers, this Drone was shot down by the VRS. 1545 It was notuntil after the summer that larger numbers of UAVs were deployed by the US Army and Air force. But,from the very start, the deployment of UAVs in Bosnia was not exactly successful. The Predatorsturned out to have serious flaws. In August 1995, two Predators were destroyed in four days. This ledto an internal joke that ‘they managed to add “soil-sampling” to their collection techniques’. OnePredator was hit by anti-aircraft fire when it descended to fly under the clouds. The other had engineproblems.Later versions of the Predator were fitted with Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), which meantthat they would not have to fly below the clouds and hence could undertake reconnaissance missions in1546bad weather. SAR enables the Predator to look through clouds and even to detect planes throughthe roofs of metal hangars. Its range was extended to 925 kilometres and it could fly at a maximumaltitude of 7.5 kilometres. It was only after September 1995 that the Predators started sendingimportant intelligence about VRS tanks, heavy weapons, ammunition depots and artillery positions1538 See for example: www.fas.org/irp/aganecy/daro/uav95/endurance.html1539 MoD, MID/TCBU. AR Briefing MID/KM, State Secret, AR No. 26/1995, 03/07/95.1540 In 1998 followed by the Outrider.1541 The planes will also be fitted with options for detecting minefields. See: Ronald W. Wilson, ‘Eyes in the Sky: ArialSystems’, Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Vol. 22 (1996) 3, p. 23.1542 Raymond D. Pickering, ‘Tactical UAVs: A Supported Unit’s Primer’, Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, Vol. 23 (1997)2, pp. 45 - 48 and Donald Harvey, ‘Intelligence Notes’, American Intelligence Journal, Vol. 16 (1995) 1, p. 94.1543 David A. Fulgham, ‘Bosnian sky spy snoops for crime’, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 06/05/96, p.25.1544 Annual Command History, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fiscal Year 1995, Top Secret, 30/09/96, pp. 31 - 32.1545 Confidential information (50).1546 David A. Fulgham, ‘Two Predators Destroyed in Bosnia’, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 21/08/95, pp. 24-25.