C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

300therefore that the late availability of the photos was not due to US reluctance to release them, as wassuggested by a minister of the Dutch Cabinet. 1631It emerged eventually that a satellite and U-2 had photographed hundreds of Muslim men on 13July. CIA analysts had paid no attention to this because they were busy with other priorities. Thesephotos from the U-2 were shown to President Clinton and his advisors for the first time on 4August. 1632 This was probably be the DIA copy of the RAF Alconbury U2 mission. This chain ofevents was largely confirmed in a talk with a US intelligence officer. Srebrenica and the other easternenclaves had absolutely no priority in the summer of 1995. So, Imint from this region was not studiedor analysed. 16335. What photos were taken and on which dates?The question still remains as to what kind of photos were actually taken, when these were taken andwhat they provided in the way of imagery. The search in the Imint archives after the tip-off from theHumint source eventually produced a lot of material. As has already been described, satellites, U-2s andUAVs were operational above Bosnia. Using background interviews, documents and aerial photos it ispossible to reconstruct the various missions above Bosnia and specifically above Srebrenica. Theshooting down of the F-16 flown by O’Grady on 2 June was the main reason for bringing extraPredators to the region. On 16 June, the US intelligence community approved the target plan for theUAVs. The most important targets were Bihac and the Croatian areas; the Livno valley had priority.However, UNPROFOR’s priorities lay with Sarajevo. Janvier was briefed on the possibilities of UAVsand said that he wanted to receive Imint. On 19 June, the intelligence staff in Zagreb asked the USintelligence community for Predator photos of Bosnia. 1634The first report based on UAV images dates from 26 June and relates to the Livno valley. Oneimportant piece of information was that all the retreat routes from the Krajina could be cut off by theBosnian Croats. The American UAVs also took photos above Croatia, but these were sent straight tothe Croats and not to the intelligence section in Zagreb: at that time, the CIA was running thePredators. The Predator operations were based out of Croatia, and the photos for Croatia were part ofthe quid-pro-quo for that basing agreement. Thanks to a UAV flight, it was reported on 28 June thatthe Bosnian Croats could attack within 24 hours.On 26 June, a U-2 flew over the whole of Bosnia, which was 65 per cent cloud covered. The U-2 Imint reports were received and disseminated at HQ Zagreb on 28 June, but presumably paid noattention to the eastern enclaves. Given the earlier UAV reports, the focus of interest was probablyCroatia. So, the priorities of the Imint analysts lay elsewhere. On 26 June a Predator indeed conducteda test flight over Liki Petrovo Selo. 1635 On 27 June, the MIS/Air Force also knew that the Americanshad decided to send some Predators to the Balkans for a period of 60 days. An analysis concluded thatthis may have stemmed from the agreed support for the Rapid Reaction Force. 1636 All aircraft inOperation Deny Flight were warned to watch out for UAVs. 1637 Things settled down for a while afterthis.On 2 July BHC in Sarajevo was requesting imagery emphasis on the Mt. Dinara area, whereVRS artillery and mortar fire was threatening Tuzla area. A flight with an UAV was planned but theUAV was grounded on 4/5 July for unknown reasons but probably because of maintenance. On 5 July,1631 Objectivized summary of the minutes of the Ministerial Council meeting of 25/08/95, prepared for the purposes of thepresent NIOD study.1632 Interview with Peter Galbraith, 23/07/99 and Tune Bringa, 13/07/00.1633 Confidential interview (13).1634 Confidential interview (54).1635 Confidential information (80).1636 MoD, SMG, 1002. Summary of Intsums MID/KL, 27/06/95.1637 MoD, DOKP.u. STAOOPER, Dossier 312, DocId, 6241, COMFIVEATAF to AIG 5781, 27/06/95.