C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

78exchange, then generally speaking it cannot expect to be provided with much in return by a friendlyservice.Neither was the international exchange encouraged by the turnaround within the Americanservices, such as the DIA and CIA. Especially after Woolsey’s departure as CIA director, intelligencestarted to serve as support to the policy of the Clinton administration, which was largely pro-Bosnian.This meant that parts of the American intelligence community were brought into conflict with friendlyWestern services. The British military intelligence service in particular suffered: the British did not sharethe American views, and the Americans slowly shut down the flow of intelligence. In particular theflow to General Rose in Sarajevo seems to have been cut off. This apparently did happen in Zagreb.This would only be restored again after some considerable time.It seemed as if only the Bundesnachrichtendienst could count on a continuation of the cordialcollaboration, but this was because officials there shared a very pro-Croat and pro-Bosnian attitude withmany people at the CIA. The interests of the American and German intelligence services ran in parallelin this respect, which was obviously to the great benefit of the mutual collaboration and exchange ofintelligence. 370 This chapter has made clear that the extent to which services recognize a perceivedshared risk (in this case Serbia), apparently influences intelligence liaison.Different political views on the origin of and solution to the conflict had an impact on theinternational intelligence liaison about the war in Bosnia between the other Western services. Thismeant an additional impetus for European and Canadian intelligence services to become activethemselves in the region. Although Ottawa was able to rely heavily on the American services, thespecific acquisition of reliable intelligence within the framework of force protection of their own unitsremained central to Canadian thinking. After all, a reliable intelligence contribution was not to beexpected from the UN.371 This led to the undesirable situation that various services sought specialintelligence that was primarily of potential interest to their own national units in Bosnia. For example,the British in 1995 concentrated heavily on Gorazde, the Canadians on Sarajevo and Visoko and theScandinavians on Tuzla, with the serious consequence that the eastern enclaves were left to their owndevices concerning the gathering of intelligence. In any case the areas did not enjoy the highest priority,as will be demonstrated later in this study. 372In various European capitals various special task forces were set up in great haste to regulateand coordinate the intake of the intelligence gathered, and to provide the policymakers with reliableintelligence. However, the gathering did not proceed smoothly and only after solving various teethingtroubles did the services get reasonably ‘up-to-speed’. There were technical problems, ranging from alack of good maps to not having enough Serbo-Croat interpreters and translators. The lack oftranslators was a particularly great problem on both sides of the Atlantic, which considerably limitedthe opportunities for an optimum use of Osint and Sigint at the start of the war. It was also impossibleto arrange the recruitment of reliable sources and agents and to build up an extensive and reliableHumint network within 24 hours. It took intelligence services months if not years to obtain goodHumint sources. Ultimately, most European services appear to have succeeded reasonably well inrecruiting informants at the highest level of the political and military leadership in Bosnia and Croatia.They appear to have been less successful where the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbs were concerned,although it has been suggested in retrospect that American and British military and civil intelligenceservices eventually recruited informants and sources close to Mladic and Karadzic. 373It is also relevant that the overall Western intelligence climate in the years after the fall of theBerlin Wall had chilled somewhat, because Western services increasingly started to spy on each other.The conflict in Bosnia aggravated the animosity between Europe and the United States even further. 374370 Confidential interview (12).371 Confidential interview (9).372 Confidential interview (8).373 Confidential interview (11).374 Loch K. Johnson, ‘spies’, Foreign Policy (September 2000), p. 35.