C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

186intervention team, where they were responsible for anti-sniper duties. These teams had been through avery special training, and they had the most up-to-date optical devices and equipment. The Frenchdetermined that Bosnian-Serb snipers were not the only ones that were active and causing largenumbers of victims among the population, but some sniper fire also came from ABiH soldiers, whodeliberately fired on their own civilian population to be able to blame the Bosnian Serbs. 980 The ABiH‘hated’ the French special unit, because they sometimes used laser weapons to disable theiropponents. 981 The French Special Forces also operated in the Maglaj. In early 1993 they are said to havebeen on standby in Split to free Morillon from Srebrenica in a secret rescue operation. 982How the Canadian battalion got out of the enclaveAmerican special units were also often spotted in Bosnia. The most important operation in whichSpecial Forces were involved took place in March 1993. Until then, neither the VRS nor the ABiH hadpermitted the Canadian battalion to be relieved by Dutchbat. On 12 February 1994, an agreement wasreached between the Canadian prime minister, Jean Chrétien, and President Clinton: American SpecialForces were to remove Canbat from Srebrenica in a night-time operation with helicopters andSuppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) aircraft. It was more or less an execution of theagreements set down in an earlier secret American memorandum, destined for the Canadian Chief ofDefence Staff, containing the promise that the American army would come to the aid of the Canadianpeacekeepers if ‘circumstances warranted and their safety was in peril’.It was agreed that in addition to Canbat, a Dutch reconnaissance unit would also be removedfrom the enclave in this operation, which after many problems 983 had meanwhile arrived in Srebrenicaat the end of February. The Chief of Operations on the Canadian side was General Maisonneuve.There were two landing sites, Dorval and Mirabel, named after the Montreal airports. The Canadiansand Dutch were to muster at Dorval, and all vehicles and heavy materiel was to be placed at Mirabel.This site was to be destroyed after removing the soldiers, so that the ABiH and VRS would not benefitfrom the equipment. NATO in Naples was informed of this plan. 984 It is not known whetherUNPROFOR command in Zagreb, or Bosnia-Hercegovina Command in Sarajevo, were aware of it. 985General M. Baril, Boutros-Ghali’s Canadian military adviser, said otherwise that he was unaware ofthese plans to remove Canbat from the enclave by force. 986 The same was true of Netherlands DefenceMinister Relus Ter Beek. 987The tension in Ottawa increased: Canbat could not leave Srebrenica and Dutchbat had still notarrived. The question was whether Dutchbat would arrive before the rotation was forced by thedeployment of air power and the Special Forces. On 20 February, a discussion took place between theCanadian commander in Srebrenica, Yvan Bouchard, and the overall Canbat commander, Moore,through coded messages. Moore spoke, for example, of visitors from Italy (being US Special Forces).The following day, the two talked to each other again about the execution of the operation.On 22 and 23 February, a meeting took place in Naples between a Canbat representative andfour members of the Canadian Joint Task Force Two (JTF2), which can be compared with the BritishSAS. 988 In the nine-page operation plan that was discussed in this meeting, the operation for removing980 John Sray, ‘selling the Bosnian Myth’, in: Foreign Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 1995 and TomQuiggin, ‘srebrenica and the international community in Bosnia’, The International Spectator, Vol. 52 (1998) 2, p. 83.981 Confidential interview (9). These arms were forbidden by international conventions. See also: Harald Doornbos, ‘Groenespionnen tussen blauwhelmen’ (‘Green spies among blue helmets’), De Stem, 10/05/95.982 Stankovic, Trusted Mole, p. 105.983 DND, Ottawa, Green Folder Confidential, Memo J3 Ops Note, 24/01/94.984 Interview with D. Moore, 15/11/99.985 The British government was also informed. Confidential information (16).986 Interview with M. Baril, 21/12/99987 Interview with A.L. ter Beek, 13/01/00.988 For JTF2 operations in Bosnia: Pugliese, Canada’s Secret Commandos, pp. 41 - 46.