C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

324OPs. Karremans noted that this information should be regarded as reliable because it came from thesame source that had announced the attack on OP-E. Nonetheless Karremans was not impressed bythe situation. He concluded with: ‘Reaction Dutchbat: continue task and, if necessary, defend theOPs.’ 1793 The intelligence report sent by the liaison officer of the 28th Division of the ABiH, EkrimSalihovic, to the 2nd Corps in Tuzla was less alarming in its tone, like the reports from Karremans. Thisreport did indicate that Dutchbat had been informed of details regarding the possible attack, but thereported activities of the VRS mostly related to the north-western section of the enclave. The VRS wasengaged in intensive reconnaissance in Zalazje close to OP-R, but the ABiH had not seen this for itselfin the area. 1794 Other ABiH officers were however of the opinion that the situation was alarming andthat a VRS attack on the enclave was imminent. There was intensification of VRS propaganda, logisticalsupport had been received from Serbia and the morale of the VRS was improving. These indicationsled Captain Nijaz Masic (responsible for the morale of the 28th Division) to conclude that the VRSdefinitely planned to conquer Eastern Bosnia. 1795In his book, Karremans mentioned that on 8 June the British Joint Commission Observers (theJCOs) who had been detailed to the battalion came to him with the suspicion that the VRS wouldattack all the enclaves within two weeks. Karremans also reported in his book that he had passed onreports from the JCOs and from the ABiH to the higher command, 1796 but the report that he sent toTuzla, Sarajevo and The Hague in fact gave only the information that the ABiH had gathered about anattack, and not the suspicions of the JCOs. 1797Strangely enough this ‘alarm letter’ from Karremans was never passed on to the MIS/Army. ItsHead at that time, Bokhoven, confirmed that in May and July 1995 Karremans had written two alarmletters to the Commander in Chief of the Army, for the attention of the minister. He had expected thata copy of these letters would be sent to the MIS/Army, but this never happened. As Head he knewnothing about the letters. If he had received copies; then the MIS/Army might have been able to makean analysis of the situation and his service might have been more alert. But he first heard about thesetwo letters during the major debriefing operation in Assen. 1798The MIS/CO did however receive Karremans’ reports and analysed the report deriving fromthe ABiH. The MIS/CO concluded that there were no indications of large-scale troop concentrations.On the other hand, this analysis concluded that the VRS around the enclave was strong enough to carryout a limited operation on the territory of the enclave and it did not seem unlikely that, just as inGorazde, the VRS would try to gain control of parts of the enclave. The MIS/CO considered howeverthat it was premature to view the limited operation against OP-E as the start of further operations. InGorazde such warnings from the ABiH had reached UNPROFOR, but they seemed intended toprompt Dutchbat to abandon the observations posts so that the ABiH could take them over. It wasconceivable that the Bosnian warnings on Srebrenica had the same goal. Another possibility consideredby the MIS was that the ABiH warnings could be intended to place responsibility for any escalationswith the VRS right from the start. The minister was properly informed of the matter. 1799The United Nations Military Observers, the UNMOs, had not expected the attack on OP-Eeither. The UNMOs had a very limited perspective in and around the enclave. This was later confirmed1793 MoD, DCBC, Box 4. HQ Dutchbat to CO SNE, 08/06/95. See also: MIS/CO. Memorandum to CDS; Re: Intelligenceon attack on Srebrenica; Author: L. Col. Van Geldere; Annotation: Col. J. Mulder Head MIS/Army; 18/03/97.1794 NIOD, Coll. CD-ROMs. ABiH Komanda 28. Divizije to Komanda 2. Korpusa, , Str. Pov. Br. 02-06-27/95, 08/08/95.1795 NIOD, Coll. CD-ROMs. ABiH Komanda 28. Divizije to Komanda 2. Korpusa RBiH Odjeljenje morala, Str. Pov. Br. 04-93/95, 09/08/95.1796 Karremans, Srebrenica, p. 149.1797 MoD, DCBC, Colonel R. van Dam to the Minister, 09/06/95.1798 Interview with H. Bokhoven, 16/05/01.1799 MoD, MIS/CO. Memorandum from Head of Operations (Col. R.S. van Dam) to the Minister, Junior Minister, CDS,PCDS and SCOCIS, 09/06/95, unnumbered. The press reports to the effect that the minister was not informed are thusincorrect. It is not clear if and how Karremans was informed of the findings of the MIS/CO.