C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

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104The organization of the MIS/ArmyThe Intelligence and Security Department of the Military Intelligence Service of the Royal NetherlandsArmy (MIS/Army) occupied itself with the question of what equipment was situated where, and whichequipment the warring factions had at their disposal. There was no formal intelligence requirementsplan. 471 In 1994 and 1995, the Intelligence and Security Department operated with the followingstructure.Section A: intelligence;Section B: Security, including Counterintelligence;Section C: liaison with military attachés and foreign partners;Section D: military geography.Section A, Intelligence, 472 was further subdivided into:A-1: Bureau Current Intelligence, Situation Centre (SitCen) and DailyIntelligence Summaries;A-2: Europe Bureau (Orders of Battle and Land Forces);A-3: Scientific and Technical Intelligence Bureau;A-4: Signals Intelligence Bureau;A-5: Literature Research and Translations Bureau (no Serbo-Croat translators);A-6: Administration, Documentation and Archive Bureau;A-7: Non-Eastern-European States Bureau (Middle East, North-Africa and therest of the world).The most important Bureau for gathering intelligence were A-2 and A-4, and for the production offinished intelligence, A-1. Some analysts at the European Bureau had experience in Bosnia because theyhad worked in the intelligence staff of Bosnia-Hercegovina Command in Kiseljak. There they hadaccess to the Linked Operational Intelligence Center Europe (LOCE) system. Intelligence in NATOwas shared through this system, which was a heavily secured communication network, and the resultsof Imagery Intelligence, Electronic Intelligence and other intelligence were shared in this way. 473The Situation Centre of Bureau A-1 had three tasks: drafting the daily Intelligence Summary of2 to 2 1/2 pages, which covered Yugoslavia in particular, but also the entire world; processing anddisseminating daily intelligence; and supervising the streamlining operation that had been initiated inNovember 1994. The daily schedule was: from 8 am - 10 am processing and analysis; 10 am -12 noonwriting; 12 noon - 1 pm reading and revising draft and 1 pm - 2 pm dissemination. The most importantsources for the Situation Centre were the products of the Europe Bureau and the Signals IntelligenceBureau, the intelligence section of UNPROFOR and material from foreign intelligence services. It sooncame to the notice of the SitCen staff that the sister services copied much of what the UNPROFORintelligence section supplied, but they too had to accept that the MIS/Army had little good intelligenceand certainly not a unique information position. The Intelligence Summary analysis and the EuropeanBureau analyses sometimes contradicted one another.471 Confidential interview (22).472 Kluiters, Supplement, p. 131.473 Confidential interview (38).
105Originally, the European Bureau’s products relating to Yugoslavia resulted from barter with theforeign partners, which had been set up by one of the staff more than 20 years previously. 474 An USofficial who had served in the US Army for 20 years, confirmed while he still worked at the DIA thatthe MIS/Army had been the most prolific producer of intelligence on the former Yugoslavia withinNATO during the Cold War. In his opinion, the MIS had excellent intelligence, but the analysis was ofinferior quality. Conversely, some US intelligence occasionally came the way of the MIS/Army viaNATO in Mons, but there was no real will to share it on the part of the Americans. 475The European Bureau’s sources were mainly Osint, UNPROFOR, sister intelligence servicesand the military attaché in Belgrade. The European Bureau did not originally have Sigint at its disposal.There was rigorous compartmentalization within the MIS/Army. Separate reports with Sigint went tothe Deputy Head of the Intelligence Department, and European Bureau staff originally did not get tosee them. This improved later; the European Bureau staff then did receive Sigint (once a week). Thequantity also grew, because the head of the MIS/Army Intelligence Department at the time wanted aweekly briefing.The European Bureau also had access to foreign material through organizations such as theECMM and UNMO. With respect to the foreign partners: good and direct contacts with theAmericans, the Germans and the Italians had been built up over the years. At the MIS/Army too, thequality rating of intelligence from foreign intelligence services was variable. ‘Not so good’ and ‘nothingunique’ were common characterizations. The liaison with the French services did not function well:French intelligence that did find its way to the MIS/Army was generally considered to be unsound.Contact with the DIS was limited. The European Bureau did receive DIS reports for perusal. Moregenerally, the DIS was said to have come up-to-speed slowly, but the reports were later rated as goodquality. In addition, material was occasionally obtained from the Danish MIS and the DIA. 476 Theproducts of the Bundesnachrichtendienst were rated as good; this service had good Humint sources,especially in the vicinity of Banja Luka and on the border with Serbia. The BND was also said to haveaccess to Comint from communications traffic by the Vojska Republika Srpska (VRS) and the ABiH. 477The MIS/Army made do with what it hadA significant problem with which not only the European Bureau, but also other Bureaus initially had tocontend, was a lack of good and reliable maps. The maps of Yugoslavia dated from the 1960s orsometimes even earlier, and it was even the case that the words ‘Führer Stab des Heeres, Ausgabe 1943’could be found printed at the bottom of some maps used by the MIS/Army. 478 The most reliable mapsused were the Royal Dutch Touring Club (ANWB) map of Yugoslavia and the street map of Sarajevoproduced for the 1986 Winter Olympics. The maps that subsequently became available were repeatedlyupdated on the basis of Imagery Intelligence supplied by the French SPOT satellite. 479 The MIS/Armymade a three-dimensional sketch at the time of Dutchbat’s deployment.Dutchbat worked in the enclave with ten year old Yugoslavian maps, which was extremelyinconvenient in discussions on establishing a demarcation line or in the event of incidents. After a visitto the enclave by the Chief of the Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff, the maps were translated to480Dutch standards, but this revision also failed to improve communication between Dutchbat and thehigher levels of command within UNPROFOR. The higher command levels worked with maps made474 Confidential interview (37).475 Confidential interviews (38 ) and (75 ).476 Confidential interview (22).477 Confidential interview (38).478 Confidential interview (34). See also: Paul Ruigrok, ‘Den Haag wist van niets, maar de onderofficieren moesten terug’ (‘Den Haag knew nothing, but the NCOs had to go back’), in: VrijNederland, 30/10/93.479 Interview with H. Bosch, 10/10/01.480 MoD, Archive CSKL, no. CRST/374, Brantz to BLS et al, 06/06/94, appendix: Trip report to Bosnia-Hercegovina, p.3.
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Srebrenica: a ‘safe’ areaAppend
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CIC - Current Intelligence CentreCI
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7SCS - Special Collection ServiceSE
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9still active staff of intelligence
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11Chapter 1The United Nations and I
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13with setting the objectives of gr
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15gathered, organized and analysed
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17The second phase in the intellige
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19can also be or become intelligenc
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21additional financial and other in
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23undermined the idea that the inte
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25that the safety of their personne
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27to generate an all-source perspec
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29in all, Van Kappen found it a ‘
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31The first step taken by the Bush
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33Virginia, where it was decided wh
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35a dual responsibility to support
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37had indications that this attack
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39example, the following is contain
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41played an important role. For thi
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43any indication of action taken. T
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45verification flights by unmanned
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47NATO’s most important troop-con
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49strategic systems were revamped t
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51Another problem was that good (no
Page 53 and 54: 53American National Reconnaissance
Page 55 and 56: 55Soviet Union’s intercontinental
Page 57 and 58: 574. The perception and information
Page 59: 59not detract from the fact that
Page 62 and 63: 62intelligence officers even told t
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Page 67: 67atrocities but the Bosnian Serbs
Page 70 and 71: 70Republika Srpska. The work was no
Page 72 and 73: 72from the fact that the Direction
Page 74 and 75: 74involved in intelligence activiti
Page 76 and 77: 76Forces were said to have received
Page 78 and 79: 78exchange, then generally speaking
Page 80 and 81: 80Chapter 3Dutch intelligence and s
Page 82 and 83: 82reorganization of the MIS. In 199
Page 84 and 85: 84commotion flaring up within the s
Page 86 and 87: 86intelligence. 394 Until that time
Page 88 and 89: 88their relief goods for Bosnia tha
Page 90 and 91: 90The BVD collaborated closely on Y
Page 94 and 95: 94cutbacks recommended by the Van I
Page 97 and 98: 97information without compromising
Page 99 and 100: 99Yugoslavia did not prove to be a
Page 101 and 102: 101MIS/CO. Intelligence sharing wit
Page 103: 103German, Italian and Danish intel
Page 107 and 108: 107that an insight was obtained usi
Page 109 and 110: 109They made civil and military ris
Page 111 and 112: 111In other words, the flow of info
Page 113 and 114: 113three tasks: looking for indicat
Page 115 and 116: 115In reality the MIS/Army function
Page 117 and 118: 117his benefit, and many others. It
Page 119 and 120: 119too. This had already been estab
Page 121 and 122: 121negative assessment: not to go t
Page 123 and 124: 123capacity of the UN, but as descr
Page 125 and 126: 125organizations that could possibl
Page 127 and 128: 127Department, the Counterintellige
Page 129 and 130: 129MIS/Air Force officer went to Tu
Page 131 and 132: 131entering into close relationship
Page 133 and 134: 133One envelope contained several f
Page 135 and 136: 135any indications of continuous gu
Page 137 and 138: 137more and more clear, turned a de
Page 139 and 140: 139intended to monitor the border c
Page 141 and 142: 141opinion. 665 After Croatia had n
Page 143 and 144: 143Lake’s statement. 676 As a Can
Page 145 and 146: 145engage these countries, but each
Page 147 and 148: 147Later that day, Galbraith report
Page 149 and 150: 149form of photos taken by spy sate
Page 151 and 152: 151In the summer and autumn of 1994
Page 153 and 154: 153starting to have concerns about
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155preferred provider of weapons to
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157Because of the logistical useful
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159An Islamic humanitarian organiza
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161and 1 rocket launcher for a TF-8
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163the convoys from Croatia with ar
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165The attempt at a cover-upAs ment
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167Force Commander and with General
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169urging it, because they suspecte
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171General and researcher, Brendan
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173mm guns, 2000 pistols, 211,000 h
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175divergent opinions on the Serbia
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177had total freedom of movement al
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179violations were observed. These
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181and Jugoslavija Publik. Accordin
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183command and the rival Iranian, S
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185much contact with the population
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187from the enclave a total of 140
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189The third party country strategy
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191the warring factions, namely tha
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193Chapter 5The Signals Intelligenc
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195In addition Comint can be import
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197policymakers, however. As a resu
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199A second disadvantage of Sigint,
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201All efforts can of course also b
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203125 linguists to provide transla
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205time intercepts involved here we
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207conclusion that the contribution
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209happened during the Gulf War, wh
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211The Gulf War showed that there w
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213Despite this reservation there i
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215The NSA and CIA, as well as GCHQ
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217million messages, sent via Intel
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219Zagreb, Morgan, - Svensson was o
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221Monitoring targets in SerbiaOffi
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223jar’, said an US intelligence
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225Naturally the Serbs had taken pr
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227confirmed that monitoring walkie
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229The same month new articles appe
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231‘They more or less admitted th
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233have been part of a Bosnian gove
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235get O’Grady out of Bosnian Ser
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237as the Balkans. Two to three yea
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239Comint archive and other archive
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241Bokhoven Couzy supported him in
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243communications traffic of UNPROF
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245Moreover, the NSA is reported to
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247The role of the Netherlands: no
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249made by Krstic and other Bosnian
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251messages, which were intercepted
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253later treetops were used. Throug
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255Conclusions on the interception
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257equipment, planned operations, t
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259made it impossible to follow the
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261community that the situation was
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263commander of the Bosnian-Serb Dr
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265to headquarters. The Comint oper
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267Intelligence Community had no ac
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269aid being sent to Sarajevo. Both
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271established in 1991, also receiv
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273crypto telephone and fax with th
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275to Baxter, the Military Assistan
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277Chapter 7Imagery Intelligence in
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2792. What instruments were availab
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281would leave around 18 hours out
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283and has provided policy-makers w
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285operational in Bosnia, like the
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287lines and troop movements. After
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289around Sarajevo and Gorazde. Thi
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291that especially American, French
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293So, it would have been impossibl
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2953. With whom was imagery intelli
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297available. 1606 The head of the
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299war crimes had probably been per
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301a US national asset (unknow is w
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303Mostar and loitered in Zepa area
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305Albright shows the photosOn 10 A
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307was taken some time in 1999, eve
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309tracking the civilian toll had v
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311solution to such problems in ad
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313Chapter 8Was ‘Srebrenica’ an
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315gathered intelligence, then it m
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317the VRS attack should aim to tak
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319In January 1995 a European intel
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321stated that the deployment of th
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323The Military Intelligence Servic
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325by the Norwegian Brigadier Gener
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327Bosnian Serbs decided that they
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329the enclaves in the very near fu
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331enclave was seriously confined b
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333The VRS’s most important commu
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335archives, together with intervie
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337the hills and mountains along th
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339from Sarajevo, because they were
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341The UN headquarters in New YorkT
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343Who did have prior knowledge? In
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345offensive was stopped before the
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347leadership of the Republika Srps
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349coming 24 hours. 1963 On 11 July
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351that it was established that the
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353very short period: 2 to 6 July.
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355transport VRS troops. 2006 Howev
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357In this respect the author Russe
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359(presumably they were referring
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361nations and within NATO never to
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363expectation that ‘on balance i
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365thorny issue. A foreign intellig
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367was a correct analysis, as was l
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369believes any news in Sarajevo.
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371as said before, this is not a na
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373Chapter 9Survey of archival reco
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375Collection of the Economic Inves
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377archive a number of messages fro
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37930. Uiterweer Post Collection: n
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Bodansky, Y., Offensive in the Balk
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Halberstam, David, War in a Time of
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O.O’shea, Brendan, Crisis at Biha
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387Woolsey, R.J., Partners for Peac
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Boyle, Alan, ‘spies in the watch
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Macdonald, Lt.-Colonel Oliver A.K.,
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393Zumach, A. ‘US intelligence kn
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Arafat YasserAristide J.B.‘Arkan
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Felix M.C.J.Franken R.A.Franssen N.
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Makar AndjelkoMarchal LucMarguin J.
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Soljic VladimirSoubirou AndréSoyst
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C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

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