C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

88their relief goods for Bosnia that could be described as non-humanitarian, such as military uniformshidden under a consignment of flour. Nonetheless, nothing could be done about this, because,according to the Militias Act, a green military camouflage suit was only a uniform if it bore militaryemblems, which was not the case. 403Merhamet in the Netherlands also maintained relations with the Turkish organization Milli Gorus,which sometimes collected money for the Bosnian Muslims. This relationship cooled, however, whenthe Turks discovered that much of the money collected was being skimmed off by the Bosnians. Theactivities of the Bosnian civil intelligence service (AID) were also monitored, mainly becauserepresentatives of different movements existed within the Bosnian delegation in The Hague. Finally,the BVD followed the activities of the Macedonians and Kosovo Albanians. Activities by the YugoslavSDB were no longer observed in 1993. 404As well as the possible influence of the developments in Yugoslavia on the Netherlands, thepolitical events in Yugoslavia itself were also the subject of investigation. In a contribution to theCVIN-Plus on 11 May 1993, the BVD produced an evaluation of the events. In a comprehensivesurvey, a summary was given of the ethnic distribution of the Yugoslavs in the Netherlands, thesituation in Yugoslavia, geostrategic consequences, the threat of war and the position of ZeljkoRaznjatovic, the leader of Arkan Tigers. At the time, there were approximately 80,000 Yugoslavs in theNetherlands, mostly Bosnian Muslims, followed by Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, Kosovars and asmall number from other groups. The BVD established that until then there had been no question ofthe application of (interethnic) force on a large scale, but that it was becoming more probable.The service expected that the active participation of the Netherlands in a UN intervention forcewould act as a catalyst. Serbia in particular had repeatedly announced that it would carry out reprisals ifit was attacked. Terrorist attacks outside Yugoslavia were likewise to be expected. The BVD establishedthat all parties were guilty of barbaric practices. The Bosnian Serbs and Serbs were especially guilty ofsystematic and large scale crimes. The BVD expected that if all parties were to agree to a peace plan,there was a possibility of a large scale military intervention in Yugoslavia, in which, according to theBVD, the lion’s share of the troops would be contributed by the United States. 405Increasing attention was paid to the situation in the Balkans from 1993 on. This is also evidentfrom the 1993 and 1994 BVD annual reports, in which an increasing number of pages were devoted toYugoslavia. As mentioned earlier, an additional task was also introduced at that time: monitoring theinternal and external security of the Yugoslavia Tribunal in The Hague, which was seen as a preeminentfocal point for subversive and violent activities.The BVD established that a Dutch citizen who had long been involved in Serbian networks,had been instructed by the Serbian secret service (SDB) to organize protest demonstrations at theTribunal. This Dutch citizen rapidly departed to the United Kingdom, however. After this the BVDobserved that, with the exception of a few incidents, there was hardly any question of a threat ofviolence against the Tribunal. Personal security was occasionally stepped up, such as during the KosovoCrisis. The BVD otherwise took account not only of Serbian but also of Bosnian actions. For instance,in September 1996 in Sarajevo, Nedzad Ugljen, one of the deputy chiefs of the Bosnian civilintelligence service, was liquidated. He was the head of the department that was responsible for tracingwar criminals and was one of the Tribunal’s contacts in Sarajevo. Although various views existed on thebackground to this liquidation, it was assumed in the Western intelligence community that he was toounreliable in the opinion of some factions within Izetbegovic’s government party and too inclined tocooperate with the Tribunal on tracing Bosnian war criminals. 406The service furthermore observed in 1994 that there were a number of war criminals from theformer Yugoslavia among asylum seekers in the Netherlands. The investigation into this issue was403 NMFA, 911.31 Yugoslavia, Memo BVD to CVIN+ participants, 24/09/93, p. 11.404 Minister of the Interior, BVD annual report 1993, pp. 33 - 36 and Confidential interview (33).405 NMFA, 911.31 Yugoslavia, Memo BVD to CVIN+ participants, 24/09/93, p. 17.406 Confidential interview (15) and MoD, Archive MIS/CO, 438-0190, Box 307, Memorandum: The Bosnian civil intelligence service AID, 07/05/97.