C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

217million messages, sent via Intelsat and Inmarsat communications satellites, were intercepted eachmonth. The technical structure was strongly upgraded from 1994 onwards. The problem was that theNSA ‘was buying all these new toys, but they don’t have the people to use them’, according to anintelligence expert. 1151 The inevitable happened: the NSA found itself unable to process the enormousflow of intercepts. 1152The greatest problem for the agency proved to be ‘the continuing decline of its Sigintprocessing, analysis and reporting infrastructure’. There was a major lack of trained personnel as aresult of early resignations and departures for the private sector. Around 1995 the service was in serioustrouble, because there was no money available to recruit new and competent personnel. The NSAencountered ‘a particularly severe problem with the size, age, skills and make-up of its workforce’.Internal problems probably also created further obstacles to the ‘free flow of intelligence informationto the Agency’s customers’. Indeed, the internal communications systems within the NSA proved to bequestionable. 1153 Moreover, the NSA is said to have had a poor relationship with the Pentagon, whichoften complained about the NSA’s unwillingness to share Sigint for fear of compromising thesource. 1154 Pentagon staff openly complained that the NSA was often unwilling to part with the militarySigint that they needed to carry out their tasks. One Pentagon employee even said that staff of the NSA‘are still fighting the Cold War and are more worried about maintaining security than improving tacticalwarfighting capabilities’. 1155 In short, besides the inherent objection to sharing high-level Comint,insufficient analysis capabilities and internal bureaucratic struggles proved a further hindrance to theexchange of Sigint.The initial lack of US Comint capabilities was also revealed by the creation of an intelligenceunit at the Southern European NATO Command at Naples (AFSOUTH), known as the DeployedShed Facility (DSF). The chief American reason for participating in this intelligence unit was that the1156NSA had major gaps in its Sigint in Bosnia. The NSA did not have the personnel capacity to manthis unit on a 24-hour basis, so other countries were asked to help out; reportedly the NetherlandsMilitary Intelligence Service (MIS) also had to contribute to this multinational unit. 1157 The proposalwas supported by NATO, but before the Head of the MIS, Piet Duijn, was prepared to agree to this hefirst wanted to know the view of Defence Minister, Relus ter Beek, who immediately agreed toparticipation. 1158In the course of time the US services became prepared to share more Sigint. The U-2reconnaissance aircraft were also able to supply valuable Sigint. The US services wanted to contributethis to the multinational gathering and processing unit in Vicenza, which was to work closely with thenew DSF. In administrative terms this cell would report to NATO; the MIS supplied personnel for thisunit too. 1159 Apart from the LOCE system, and within the DSF, the NATO member states alsomutually exchanged Sigint on Bosnia. This took place (and takes place) traditionally on a bilateral basis.There was also a regular exchange between NATO member states and non-alliance countries such asAustria and Finland, and also with neutral states such as Switzerland and Sweden.1151 Confidential interview (62).1152 Seymour M. Hersh, ‘The Intelligence Gap: How the Digital Age Left Our Spies Out in the Cold’, The New Yorker,06/12/99, p. 58 ff.1153 See: Matthew M. Aid, ‘The Time of Troubles: The US NSA in the Twenty-First Century’, in: Intelligence and NationalSecurity, Vol. 15 (2000) 3, pp. 1-32.1154 Matthew M. Aid, ‘The Time of Troubles: The US NSA in the Twenty-First Century’, in: Intelligence and National Security,Vol. 15 (2000) 3, pp. 17-20.1155 David Fulgrum, ‘Compute Combat Rules Frustrate the Pentagon’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 15/09/97, p. 68.1156 Confidential interview (22).1157 MoD, MIS/CO. No. 14312, Report of Directing Council, no. DIS/93/157/1645, 23/04/93.1158 MoD, DS. no. 335, Memorandum from Commodore P.J. Duijn, no. DIS/93/214/1474, 28/04/93 and Memorandumfrom Commander J. Waltmann to the Minister, no. SN93/938/2918, 12/05/93.1159 MoD, MIS/CO. HMID Kok to the Minister of Defence, no. DIS/95/50.1/1366, 09/06/1995.