C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

327Bosnian Serbs decided that they would no longer confine themselves to the southern part of theenclave, but would extend the operation and take the town of Srebrenica itself. Karadzic was informedthat the results achieved now put the Drina Corps in a position to take the town; he had expressed hissatisfaction with this and had agreed to a continuation of the operation to disarm the ‘Muslim terroristgangs’ and to achieve a full demilitarization of the enclave. In this order, issued by Major GeneralZdravko Tolimir, it was also stated that Karadzic had determined that the safety of UNPROFORsoldiers and of the population should be ensured. Orders to this effect were to be provided to allparticipating units. The safety of the population should also be guaranteed in the event that they shouldattempt to cross to the territory of the Republika Srpska. The orders made no mention of a forcedrelocation of the population. The VRS units were to be ordered not to destroy any civilian propertyunless they met with resistance. Buildings were not to be set on fire. A final instruction, also ofsignificance, was that the population and prisoners of war should be treated in accordance with theGeneva Convention. 1818 On 11 July all of Srebrenica fell into the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. 1819The conquest of Srebrenica was, according to some authors, ‘not to be attributed to anunexpected decision taken by unpredictable Serb leaders at an unguarded moment; it was probably acarefully planned operation that had been prepared four months before the actual start of theattack’. 1820 This is incorrect. The plans for an attack on the enclave were actually drawn up at a very latestage and in a very short time; there was no months-long preparation. It was a question of days.Equally, it was not intended to occupy the enclave in its entirety. This decision was taken only on theevening of 9 July. This ad hoc decision was confirmed by a VRS soldier in an interview with the BanjaLuka Srpska Vojska. He took part in the attack and was involved in the ‘rectification’ of the chaoticsituation that arose later. According to him the Bosnian Serbs had not planned to take Srebrenica at all,but on 9 July the VRS had come so close to the enclave that it was decided to press on. This was due tothe lack of any serious resistance by the ABiH. 1821The question of whether there was prior knowledge of the attack on the entire enclave is thusrelevant only to 9 and 10 July; the issue of prior knowledge of the attack on the southern tip of theenclave, by contrast, must focus on the period from 2 to 6 July, because this is when preparations forthe Krivaja ‘95 plan were made. It needs to be established what information was gathered during thistime and how this was interpreted by the UNPROFOR staff in Tuzla, Zagreb and Sarajevo. Followingthis, it will be examined whether documents of UNPROFOR, DPKO and official documents fromprivate and government archives or conducted interviews cast light on the question as to whether therewere relevant indications, and whether Western intelligence services passed on intelligence to thepolitical and military policymakers within UNPROFOR.5. The intelligence situation of UNPROFORAccording to press reports General Smith had been warned by an UNPROFOR report that if theABiH continued its offensive around Sarajevo, the VRS would attack the enclaves in order to conquerthem and thus to free soldiers for the battle in other areas. 1822 Smith himself claimed that the attackcame as a great surprise and the Political Director at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, andformer chairwoman of the British Joint Intelligence Committee, Pauline Neville-Jones, stated thesame. 1823 By the same token, the Swedish negotiator Carl Bildt said he had no indications of a military1818 ICTY (IT-33-98) OTP Ex 64B, Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska to President of Republika Srpska, forinformation, Drina Corps IKM/Forward Command Post, Generals Gvero and Krstic, personally, 09/07/95, Strictly Conf.No. 12/46-501/95.1819 For a detailed analysis of the fall of Srebrenica: Chapter 6 in Part III of the main report.1820 Van Staden, De fuik, 1997, p. 9 and Westerman & Rijs, Het Zwartste Scenario, p. 148.1821 Zeljko Planincic, ‘The call for help goes out to the best’, Banja Luka Srpska Vojska, (FBIS translation), 03/11/95.1822 S. Sullivan and A. Sage, ‘Britain’s UN forces gave warning of Serb attacks’, The Times, 15/07/95.1823 Interview with P. Neville-Jones, 15/11/01.