C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

103German, Italian and Danish intelligence was generally rated as good. The intelligence of the British andFrench military intelligence services, the DIS and the Service Generale de Reinseignement (SGR) and laterDRM, was rated as reasonable. The MIS/CO had good access to the DIS. Furthermore, the Swiss andAustrian services provided excellent reports based on the debriefings of refugees from the Balkans. Itwas often observed in interviews that the quality of the partner information depended heavily on thepersonal contacts of the analyst. Contacts with Spain, for example, were pro forma while those with theBND were good. Contacts with the DIA were sporadic: usually once a year. 467Prior to 1994, the MIS/CO had no contact whatsoever with the CIA or with SIS: this wascarried out by the IDB. After the IDB was disbanded in 1994, the MIS/CO did establish some contactsin the direction of the British and the Americans. MIS/CO Head Kok therefore had regular contactwith the CIA Chief of Station. The Head of the MIS/CO Intelligence Staff was also responsible for allother foreign contacts. Initially, the Chief of Station visited Kok, but, after Knapp’s arrival, heapproached the Head of the Intelligence Staff, whom he visited once every two weeks. The overallfeeling at the MIS/CO was that the Chief of Station generally came more to request intelligence than tosupply it on behalf of the CIA. The US official occasionally gave briefings at the Defence CrisisManagement Centre, where use was sometimes made of Imagery Intelligence from satellites and U-2spy planes. 468In short, the information position of the MIS/CO on strategic developments in the political,economic and military sphere could certainly not be called strong, due to a lack of sufficient personnel,unique sources and intelligence gathering facilities of its own. The sole analyst had to ‘make do’ withinformation from the UN, the final analyses (not the sources) from the MISs of the Armed Forces,foreign counterparts and open sources.The MISs of the branches of the Armed Forces and BosniaAlongside the MIS/CO, the Intelligence and Security departments of the three branches of the ArmedForces (MIS/Army, MIS/Air Force and MIS/Navy) were responsible for gathering intelligence onYugoslavia. This section is mainly devoted to the activities of the MIS/Army, which bore the primaryresponsibility for gathering military intelligence destined for the leaders of the Royal Netherlands Armyand the Dutch units in Bosnia. There will also be a brief description of the work of the MIS/Air Force,which gathered intelligence within the framework of the Force Protection of the Dutch F-16s thatoperated from Italy over Bosnia. Although the Royal Netherlands Navy participated in operations inthe Adriatic Sea, there will be no separate section on the MIS/Navy, because it played no role in thesituation surrounding the eastern enclaves.It might have been expected that the MIS/Army would become more actively involved ingathering intelligence as part of the process of decision-making on the deployment of Dutchbat,certainly after Dutch troops left for Bosnia. An interview with the Head of the Intelligence and SecurityDepartment, who was also Deputy Head of the MIS/Army, Colonel H. Bosch, revealed that this onlytook place to a very limited extent. 469 A related impetus could also have been the appointment of a newHead of the MIS/Army, Colonel H. Bokhoven, who held this position from 19 April 1994 to 15December 1995. 470 He had built up considerable experience in Bosnia. In 1993 and 1994, he was PlanOfficer with the French Force Commander, Jean Cot.467 Confidential interview (28).468 T he minutes of these confidential briefings were not found in the archives of the MoD .469 Interviews with H. Bosch, 10/05/99 and 10/10/01.470 Kluiters, Supplement, p. 133.