C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

131entering into close relationships with the local population, not putting envelopes in the wastepaperbasket, and so on. A warning was also given that the UNMO interpreters had a direct line to the localpolitical and military leaders, and that everything that was discussed with them was passed onimmediately. 619Karremans said he already recognized this danger and had ordered the commander of theOperations room to keep an eye on the interpreters. Main reason: the Dutch could not be certain thatthe four interpreters were reliable. 620 These doubts proved justified: one of them was a cousin of ABiHcommander Naser Oric. This was confirmed by intelligence officer Wieffer. Dutchbat was aware thatthey had to exercise extreme caution where their interpreters were concerned. Dutchbat thereforeensured that the interpreters had only a limited amount of knowledge; they never entered theOperations room. They had to remain outside, were not allowed to look at the maps and could notattend certain discussions. The same was true of the cleaning ladies who were hired in. They wereallowed to do certain things and not others. This had to do with security. According to Wieffer, thissystem was mainly geared towards keeping the ABiH at a distance and it functioned reasonably well.The ABiH was not to know what Dutchbat knew about them or what was being said left and rightabout the VRS. Wieffer thinks that Dutchbat dealt with this problem fairly well. 621The Military Security Bureau or Counterintelligence Bureau did not investigate the backgroundof the dispatched soldiers, including the battalion leaders. Staff of both Bureau’s stated that they werenever asked to investigate the pasts of Dutchbat soldiers, and Couzy never indicated to the MIS/Armythat an extra check should be carried out on the battalion leaders. However, the Royal NetherlandsArmy did receive an offer to investigate the battalion leaders from the MIS/CO. It was not accepted. 622The military security of Dutchbat in the enclaveThe next question concerns the state of affairs of Dutchbat’s military security once the battalion arrivedin the enclave. Much came to light during debriefings after the fall of Srebrenica. It is true that not allthe personnel were debriefed after deployments, but attention was focused on key staff and soldierswho had experienced something specific. The list of people to be debriefed was drawn up in agreementwith the unit’s security officer, and sometimes with the staff officer for personnel or intelligence.On their return, every soldier had to complete a form containing a number of specificquestions. Questions were asked on the following: the function, loss or theft of arms and otherequipment, contact with the warring factions, incidents, etc. Based partly on prior knowledge of theindividuals concerned, this checklist determined who should be debriefed. After Colonel Bosch wasappointed Head of Couzy’s Private Office, it became customary to send General Couzy a report on asingle A4 sheet of the most important items of information the very next day after a debriefing.Shocking matters sometimes emerged from these debriefings relating to security. 623For instance, it emerged from a debriefing of one Dutchbat soldier that the Opstina (themunicipal council) assigned cleaners who spoke reasonable English or German. However, in spite of allthe recommendations made by the Military Security Bureau, they were still allowed to clean the CCompany Operations room in Potocari at the time of Dutchbat II. The Dutchbat soldier concernedfound this rather surprising from a military security point of view. Yet the Operations room wascleaned twice a day by 3 or 4 women, and it was simply impossible to watch their every move. Patrolschedules, leave rosters, duty and guard schedules, and a detailed map showing the division into sectorsall hung in the Operations room. There was also the communication equipment, and the logbook ofincoming messages was left open in front of the radio. There were no classified documents or telexes,619 MoD, Archive MIS/CO,File 443-0224 , lecture to the LSO personnel 13th AMB, date unknown (approx. end 1993).620 Karremans, Who Cares, p. 41.621 Interview with E. Wieffer, 18/06/99.622 Confidential interview (25).623 Confidential interview (20).