C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

346of the use of air power, but since final approval still lay with Akashi, and in the light of previous UNreactions, the threat of air strikes presumably remained ‘a hollow one’. The VRS knew this and this waswhy the Dutch had been taken hostage. 1946 In a Cosmic Top Secret Bohemia report by the CombinedAir Operations Centre (CAOC) in Vicenza on 11 July, all the developments were summarized. Theattack had been interrupted for some time. The VRS had now set an ultimatum that UNPROFOR andthe ABiH should depart, leaving behind their weapons and equipment. Even now, no mention wasmade of the intention to take the enclave as a whole. 1947 In the Balkan IntSum of 11 June, however, itwas noted that the VRS now controlled Srebrenica. For the coming 24 to 48 hours it was predicted thatmore UNPROFOR soldiers and UNMOs would become hostages or targets. The VRS operation couldwell be the start of a new (either planned or ad hoc) strategy. The aim could be twofold: force theBosnian Muslims to accept Bosnian Serb conditions for peace negotiations and/or the elimination ofthe eastern enclaves (‘always a thorn in their side’). In addition it would release troops for otherpurposes. 1948An analysis by JAC Molesworth on 11 July noted that the attack ‘runs counter to what has beenexpected of them for several years’. The VRS had encountered little resistance and had conquered moreterritory than expected. After Srebrenica the focus turned to Zepa and Gorazde. It was also expectedthat the VRS would pressure the population to leave the town and to head for the surrounding hills andvillages or to go to Zepa. This stream of refugees would cause a humanitarian crisis, by which the VRScould achieve one or possibly two goals. First of all, Srebrenica was no longer a military factor.Secondly Sarajevo would be forced to the negotiating table. In the meantime 400 Dutch soldiers couldbe used as hostages against possible air strikes. ‘It is basically a no-lose situation for the Bosnian Serbs’,according to JAC, Molesowrth. If Sarajevo did not wish to negotiate, then the VRS had at leasteliminated the enclave and the Serb army would switch its attention to Zepa. The story would berepeated and once again the VRS might manage to achieve its earlier goals: elimination of Zepa andforce Sarajevo to negotiate. If this once again failed to work, then it would be Gorazde’s turn. Althoughthe ABiH was stronger in Gorazde, the VRS would have new troops (about ten brigades) at itsdisposal. 1949Intelligence briefings at NATO in Brussels in the days after the fall were confined to the actualcourse of the battle around Srebrenica. No attempts were made to predict VRS strategy. It was thoughtunlikely that the VRS was carrying out a coordinated attack on the eastern enclaves, or that theconquest of Srebrenica had been ordered by the high command. 1950 In short, it can be concluded thatno intelligence reached the MIS that indicated an attack. But was intelligence possibly received in abilateral context? And how did the MIS actually analyse the situation?The Military Intelligence Service and the attack on SrebrenicaAs earlier described, the information situation of the Military Intelligence Service of the CentralOrganization (MIS/CO) and the Military Intelligence Service of the Royal Netherlands Army(MIS/Army) was not a unique or special one. Analyses by the MIS/Army made following the fall ofOP-E regarding a possible VRS attack went no further than the supposition that the VRS couldcontinue to take over OPs and that the ABiH would try to increase the tension through provocation,resulting in bombardment of ABiH positions and possibly of civilian targets. 1951 This analysis wasconfirmed a few days later: a repeat of the scenario that had been applied during the taking of OP-Ewas possible, but as long as the hostage crisis was not solved, this would be unwelcome to the1946 Confidential information (74).1947 Confidential information (75).1948 Confidential information (76).1949 Confidential information (77).1950 Confidential information (168).1951 MoD, MIS/Army. INTSUM 107/95, 07/06/95.